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ARTICLE
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND
THIRD PARTIES
by
Michael B. Metzger*
and Michael J. Phillips**

ERHAPS the most significant development in twentieth century contract law is a phenomenon that Professor Charles Knapp has aptly
termed "the proliferation of promissory estoppel." 1 After its first authoritative formulation in section 90 of the original Restatement of Contracts, 2 promissory estoppel's reliance principle eventually spread
throughout the law of contract. 3 In recent years, moreover, the doctrine has
shown definite signs of leaving its host and becoming an independent theory
of recovery or cause of action in its own right. 4 Over roughly the same
period, third parties 5 who have relied on the promisor's promise have begun
to use promissory estoppel.
This Article concerns this last application of promissory estoppel, its extension to third parties. 6 A background discussion begins with a sketch of
* A.B., J.D., Indiana University. Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University.
** B.A., Johns Hopkins University; J.D., Columbia University School of Law; LL.M.,
S.J.D., National Law Center, George Washington University. Professor of Business Law,
School of Business, Indiana University.
1. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferationof PromissoryEstoppel,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981). As Knapp notes, promissory estoppel "has become perhaps
the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liability."
Id. at 53.
2. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
3. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 1, at 55-79 (discussing promissory estoppel's proliferation
throughout the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (198 1)). See generally infra notes 899 and accompanying text.
4. See Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent
Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472 (1983); see also infra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.
5. As used here, the term "third party" simply means any recipient of the promisor's
promise other than the promisee.
6. This Article concerns third-party reliance and the third party's ability to make a promissory estoppel claim against the promisor. The discussion omits situations where the thirdparty beneficiary of a promise attempts to use the promisee's reliance to enforce the promise.
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promissory estoppel's twentieth century evolution. The Article then considers the present state of the law regarding reliance-based promissory liability
to third parties. 7 The analysis principally concerns this body of law's implications for the claim that promissory estoppel is becoming an independent
theory of recovery. The Article concludes by briefly considering the benefits
and pitfalls of aggressively using promissory estoppel to protect relying third
parties. A major theme of this last section is the need for limits on this
potentially quite expansive form of promissory liability.
I.
A.

THE ONWARD MARCH OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

From the Nineteenth Century to the First Restatement

Although authorities frequently have said that the promisee's reliance was
critical to the earlier action of assumpsit, 8 reliance played relatively little
role in the classical contract law that emerged during the nineteenth century. 9 The general result was to diminish the scope of contractual liability, ' 0
primarily through the "bargained-for exchange" requirement of consideration outlined in Holmes's The Common Law II and later adopted by the first
and second Restatements.' 2 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts declares, "[a] performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by
the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise."' 13 Detrimental reliance by the promisee may
See Note, Should a Beneficiary Be Allowed to Invoke Promisee's Reliance to Enforce Promisor's
Gratuitous Promise?, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 353 (1972). Apparently, no author has fully treated
the subject of third parties' use of promissory estoppel. See IA CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 200,
at 219-20 (1963) (brief discussion generally supporting extension of promissory estoppel to
certain third parties); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 465 (1950) (arguing against extension); Knapp, supra note 1, at
61; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 543-44; Note, Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, Promissory
Estoppel and the Employment At- Will Doctrine, 8 U. HAW. L. REV. 163, 174-76, 182-85 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, Ravelo]; The Requirements of PromissoryEstoppel as Applied to Third Party
Beneficiaries, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 174 (1968).
7. This discussion includes an examination of the role reliance has come to play in conventional contract recoveries by third-party beneficiaries. See infra notes 106-146 and accompanying text.
8. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment a (1981) ("[iut is fairly
arguable that the enforcement of informal contracts in the action of assumpsit rested historically on justifiable reliance on a promise"); see also Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 482
n.57 (citing sources); cf Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 678, 679 (1984) (in 18th century, promises often enforced primarily because promisee
relied on promise to his detriment or promisor's benefit).
9. "The reliance principle of the eighteenth century did not fit within the structure of the
classical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century." Feinman, supra note 8, at 681.
10. Cf. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 13-16 (paperback ed. 1974) (describing
general theory of classical contract law associated with Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, and
theory's dedication to limited liability).
11. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230-32 (M. Howe ed., paperback ed.
1963).
12. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71(1), (2) (1981); see G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 19-21.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981).
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qualify as a performance. 14 Unless the promisor made his promise to obtain
that performance,' 5 however, there is no bargained-for exchange and thus no
consideration. 16 As Holmes declared in 1884, "[i]t would cut up the doctrine of consideration by the roots, if a promisee could make a gratuitous
promise binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it."', 7 From the perspective of classical contract law, therefore, "if A, without the protection of
a binding contract, improvidently relies, to his detriment, on B's promises
and assurances, that may be unfortunate for A but is no fit matter for legal

concern."18
Despite the bargained-for exchange requirement, the courts were busy enforcing gratuitous promises in a wide range of discrete contexts during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The factor of detrimental reliance by the promisee unites these various situations. Examples include: (1)
charitable subscriptions, (2) promises to make a gift of land, (3) gratuitous

bailments, (4) gratuitous agency relations, (5) promises to pay employees
bonuses or pensions, (6) promises to waive conditions on one's contractual
liability, and (7) promises to reduce rents. 19 The doctrine of equitable estoppel also protected reliance during this period. 20 An estopped party, who had

made representations regarding material facts, could not later deny or modify such representations in court once another party had relied upon the

representations. 21 Equitable estoppel's "material fact" requirement would
seem to have blocked the doctrine's use as a device for enforcing promises.
By the turn of the century, however, some courts began to use equitable

14. See id.§ 71(3) (performance may consist of act other than promise; forbearance; or
creation, modification, or destruction of legal relation).
15. "In the typical bargain, the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of
motive or inducement: the consideration induces the making of the promise and the promise
induces the furnishing of the consideration.... [B]oth elements must be present, or there is no
bargain." Id. § 71 comment b.
16. For example: "A promises to make a gift of $10 to B. In reliance on the promise B
buys a book from C and promises to pay C $10 for it. There is no consideration for A's
promise." Id. illustration 3. The illustration concludes: "As to the enforcement of such
promises, see § 90." Id.
17. Commonwealth v. Scituate Sav. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884).
18. G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 15.
19. See generally Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents (pts. 1-2), 50
MICH.

L.

REV.

639, 873 (1952).

20. See, e.g., infra Notes 22, 34 and cases cited there.
21. More precisely, the following elements comprise the equitable estoppel doctrine: (1)
conduct, for example acts, language, or silence, by the estopped party amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts; (2) knowledge of these facts by the party estopped at
the time of such conduct, or at least circumstances from which such knowledge could be necessarily imputed; (3) no knowledge concerning the truth of these facts by the other party; (4) the
estopped party's intention or expectation that the other party would act upon the conduct; (5)
reliance by the other party on the conduct, so that he acted upon it; and (6) a resulting change
in position for the worse by the other party. 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805
(5th ed. 1941). Also, there is some authority for the proposition that the other party's reliance
must have been reasonable. Note, Part Performance, Estoppel, and the California Statute of
Frauds,3 STAN. L. REV. 281, 289-90 (1951). Ordinarily, equitable estoppel would "'estop' the
maker of a statement of fact by sealing his mouth in court," thus making "the representor
powerless to dispute the facts upon which liability is based." Henderson, PromissoryEstoppel
and TraditionalContract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 376 (1969).
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estoppel as a pretext for binding promisors to their promises. 22
Eventually, the scattered cases protecting unbargained-for promissory reliance came to be united under a general principle of promissory estoppel.
Although one author credits Williston's 1920 contracts treatise with the initial use of the term, 2 3 the Restatement of Contracts first authoritatively formulated promissory estoppel in 1932. Section 75(1) of the Restatement
presented a conventional definition of consideration containing the bargained-for exchange requirement. 24 Then, under a general heading entitled
"Informal Contracts Without Assent or Consideration," section 90 enunciated the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 25 Entitled "Promise Reasonably
Inducing Definite and Substantial Action," the section provides: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
'26
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
Section 90 does not require that the parties bargain for the promisee's
action or forbearance, and thus seems to contradict section 75(1). In fact, as
27
Gilmore has observed, sections 75(1) and 90 are "matter and anti-matter."
Unlike section 75(1) and its bargain principle, section 90 "frankly recognizes
the reliance element in the law of contracts and ... substitutes reliance for
the bargaining element without which simple contracts are not normally
28
enforceable."
B. Subsequent Applications
Section 90 was tolerably clear about the elements of the new doctrine it
legitimated. They are: (1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character, (3) that does induce such action or forbearance, and (4) whose
enforcement is the only way to avoid injustice. 29 On its face, then, section 90
stated a rule of great generality--one that theoretically could explain most
successful contract suits except those involving wholly executory agreements
22. See, e.g, Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 795-96, 106 P. 88, 94 (1909); Banning v.

Kreiter, 153 Cal. 33, 36, 94 P. 246, 247 (1908); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 56-57, 77
N.W. 365, 366-67 (1898). Since each of these cases involved reliance on a promise, equitable
estoppel theoretically did not apply. See also infra note 34.
23. Boyer, supra note 6, at 459 (citing 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139 (1st ed. 1920)).

24.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 75(1) (1932) provides that: "consideration for a

promise is (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance.., bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise."
25. Section 90 does not use the term "promissory estoppel," but Williston regarded the
section as a statement of the doctrine he had first identified. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 140, at 503 (rev. ed 1936).
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
27. See G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 61. On the drafting history behind these two
sections, see id. at 62-65.
28. Seavey, Reliance Upon GratuitousPromises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913,
925 (1951).
29. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
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on which the promisee has not relied.30
The First Restatement shed little light on the applicable contexts for this
facially sweeping rule. 31 Since section 90 was promulgated, promissory estoppel has principally served as a substitute for consideration. Although for
some time this use of promissory estoppel was restricted to certain classes of
cases, 32 by now the doctrine is available in virtually all situations where con33
sideration is absent.
34
Over time, promissory estoppel has also seen increasing use as a device
for circumventing the writing requirement imposed by the statute of
frauds. 35 In general, this means that a party can be estopped from raising
30. Eg.; Feinman, supra note 8, at 685-86 ("If reliance was a coequal rather than a
residual basis for recovery, most contract cases could be seen as reliance cases rather than
consideration cases."). In the normal breach of contract case, the promisor-defendant will
have made a promise, and the promisee-plaintiff will typically have relied by performing. In
many situations the promisor could reasonably foresee this performance. One would expect
the courts to conclude that injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise in most
instances of this sort. Where the contract is completely executory, the promisee cannot have
relied by performing under the contract. In this case, however, promissory estoppel might still
be available if the promisee foreseeably relies in some other fashion not contemplated by the
contract.
31. As if to reinforce the uncertainty created by its sweeping text, the original § 90 was
accompanied by no comments and only four illustrations. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 90 (1932). As Gilmore has noted:
The extent to which the new § 90 was to be allowed to undercut the underlying
principle of § 75 was left entirely unresolved.... An attentive study of the four
illustrations will lead any analyst to the despairing conclusion, which is of
course reinforced by the mysterious text of § 90 itself, that no one had any idea
what the damn thing meant.
G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 64-65. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 178 comment f
(1932) did, however, suggest that promissory estoppel might have limited application in the
statute of frauds context. See infra note 34.
32. The most notable example is Judge Learned Hand's decision in James Baird Co. v.
Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933), which held promissory estoppel inapplicable to
promises that "propose bargains," and limited promissory estoppel to "donative" promises.
See also S. WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 140, at 504 (apparently limiting promissory estoppel
to discrete situations where reliance had traditionally been protected).
33. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6-7, at 210 (2d ed.
1977) (sketching promissory estoppel's traditional role as consideration substitute); id. § 6-8, at
211 (modern trend in promissory estoppel cases to enforce any promise that meets doctrine's
requirements).
34. The use of estoppel to evade the statute of frauds traces back at least to the beginning
of the twentieth century. Equitable estoppel has long been used to avoid the statute's writing
requirement. See, e.g., Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 VILL. L. REV. 63, 75-77 (1980-81). In some turn-of-the-century
statute of frauds cases, courts that purported to use equitable estoppel to enforce promises
ignored equitable estoppel's "misrepresentation of a material fact" requirement. See supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text; Metzger & Phillips, supra, at 80-81 (citing cases ignoring
requirement in statute of frauds context). The best-known example is Seymour v. Oelrichs,
156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909), where the court used equitable estoppel to estop the defendants
from using the statute of frauds as a defense because they had breached an ancillary promise to
reduce an oral contract to a writing. The Restatement later incorporated this "ancillary promise" exception to the statute of frauds. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 178 comment f

(1932) (promise to make memorandum, if relied upon, may give rise to promissory estoppel if
statute would otherwise operate to defraud claimant).
35. See, e.g., Edwards, The Statute of Frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Doctrine of Estoppel, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 205 (1978); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 34; Note,
Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1219 (1978);
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the statute as a defense if his promise has caused the other party to rely
foreseeably and substantially. Here, the states differ considerably in their
use of the estoppel doctrine. The most aggressive courts employ promissory
estoppel when the claimant has relied on oral promises contained in the contract itself.36 Others employ promissory estoppel only when the claimant
has relied on a so-called "ancillary" promise such as a promise to reduce an
oral contract to a writing. 37 Still other courts deny promissory estoppel any
38
effect in the statute of frauds context.
Although the case law on the subject is sparse, one author argues that
courts should use promissory estoppel to allow the introduction of promises
otherwise blocked by the parol evidence rule. 39 Much better established,
however, is the doctrine's effect in the offer and acceptance context. Any
offer contains a promise to which section 90 might apply. If this promise is
too incomplete or indefinite to create normal contractual liability, g° can
promissory estoppel nonetheless make it binding? Despite numerous statements that the promise must be definite to create liability under promissory
estoppel, 4 1 some courts have used the doctrine to impose contractual liability
by enforcing promises that could not qualify as offers. 42 Finally, at least one
Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds, 44

FORDHAM

L.

114 (1975); Note, supra note 21; Annotation, Comment Note.-PromissoryEstoppel as
Basisfor Avoidance of Statute of Frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037 (1974).
36. E.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 624-27, 220 P.2d 737, 740-42 (1950);
McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 36-37, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (1970). See generally Annotation,
supra note 35, § 6[a].
37. E.g., Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 415, 420-21, 493 P.2d
1220, 1225-26 (1972); see also supra note 34. See generally Annotation, supra note 35, § 5[a],
at 1058 (ancillary promise to reduce agreement to writing enforceable despite statute of
frauds). Some courts also require that there be fraud or gross injustice for this "ancillary
promise" rule to operate. Annotation, supra note 35, §§ 5[b], 5[c]. At least one court enforced
an ancillary promise not to raise the statute of frauds as a defense to an oral contract. E.g.,
Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 86-87, 193 P. 84, 87 (1920).
38. E.g., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965), aft'd, 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966). See generally Annotation, supra note 35, § 4,
at 1052-53 (discussing policy that estoppel should not frustrate purposes of statute of frauds).
39. See Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36
VAND. L. REV. 1383 (1983). The promisee's reliance on the promise may justify introducing
otherwise inadmissible parol promises. Id. at 1408-22.
40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 32 (1932); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 33, § 2-13 (traditional rule that offer must be definite as to its material terms). By
now, however, this traditional rule has been loosened considerably. See e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2REV.

204(1) (3);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 33 & comments a, b (1981).

41. E.g., Keil v. Glacier Park, Inc., 614 P.2d 502, 506-07 (Mont. 1980) (promise must
meet traditional contract standards of definiteness); Perlin v. Board of Educ., 86 Ill. App. 3d
108, 114, 407 N.E.2d 792, 798 (1980) (unambiguous promise); Malaker Corp. v. First N.J.
Nat'l Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 479, 395 A.2d 222, 230 (1978) ("clear and definite promise").
42. See Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 95-96 (Tex. 1965) (plaintiff able to recover
under promissory estoppel even though agreement lacked material terms); Hunter v. Hayes,
533 P.2d 952, 953 (Colo. App. 1975) (promissory estoppel recovery allowed even though no
evidence of meeting of minds on all terms of contract); see also Walker v. KFC Corp., 515 F.
Supp. 612, 620 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (jury instruction that mere promise, not clear and unambiguous promise, needed for estoppel found satisfactory); Mooney v. Craddock, 35 Colo. App. 20,
24-26, 530 P.2d 1302, 1304-05 (1974) (absence of mutual agreement regarding some essential
terms of contract does not prevent liability under promissory estoppel). Promissory estoppel
aside, it is also well established that reliance can provide a basis for enforcing an indefinite

offer. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 34(3) (1981); Henderson, supra
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case has seemingly held that promissory estoppel may create liability even in
43
the absence of an acceptance.
C.

The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent

Theory of Recovery
Even though their language may occasionally suggest otherwise, 44 this article characterizes the mutual assent cases just discussed as contract decisions where promissory estoppel effectively substitutes for a defective offer or

a missing acceptance. An increasing number of promissory estoppel cases,
however, seem better described as decisions where the doctrine has departed

the contract framework and become an independent cause of action. Indeed,
promissory estoppel's increasing use inside the contract framework leads by
degrees to such a result.
Imagine a hypothetical jurisdiction that has aggressively employed promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration, for the statute of frauds'
writing requirement, and as a device for curing indefinite offers and missing
acceptances. In such a state, therefore, a party can establish most of the
important elements of an enforceable contract through promissory estoppel.4 5 Generally speaking, moreover, the promissory estoppel inquiry will be
much the same at each point (offer, acceptance, consideration, etc.) in the
contract analysis. 46 This being so, consider a situation in which liability
note 21, at 362; Knapp, supra note 1, at 53. Finally, perhaps the best known example of
promissory estoppel's use to enforce an indefinite offer, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26
Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), is better classed as a case where promissory estoppel was
used as a basis of recovery distinct from contract. For a discussion of Hoffman, see infra notes
67-77 and accompanying text.
43. In N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736, 738-40 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
the subcontractor Litterio made a bid to the general contractor Glassman to perform the brick
and masonry work on a school construction project on which Glassman was soon to make its
own bid. Glassman told Litterio that its bid was the lowest received, that Glassman was using
the bid to compute its own bid, and that Litterio would get the subcontract for the brick and
masonry work if Glassman's bid was accepted. After Glassman received the general contract,
it sent Litterio a proposed subcontract containing terms that the parties had not previously
discussed and that materially altered Litterio's original offer. Litterio backed out of the deal,
Glassman sued, and Glassman won a summary judgment at the district court level. The court
of appeals found no bilateral contractual basis for the district court's decision. Id. at 740. The
court explained that Glassman's proposed subcontract was not an acceptance, but a counteroffer. Id. at 738-39. But this contract law holding did "not dispose of the separate question of
promissory estoppel." Id. at 739. The appeals court, therefore, remanded the case to determine whether Glassman could bind Litterio under promissory estoppel. Id. In effect, then,
the court held that promissory estoppel liability might exist in the absence of an acceptance.
44. E.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953 (Colo. App. 1975) ("circumstances permit
the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and allow the enforcement of the promise without evidence of a meeting of the minds").
45. The most obvious exceptions to this generalization are contractual capacity and the
requirement that a contract have a legal object. For some suggestions as to how each might be
accommodated within the § 90 framework, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 546-47.
46. Admittedly, however, this may sometimes not be the case. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 139 comment b (1981), for example, states that "the requirement of consideration is more easily displaced [by estoppel] than the requirement of a writing." For some
other possible problems of this sort, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 509 n.241. Such
problems might, however, be remedied by using the toughest of the various promissory estoppel tests at each point where estoppel is applied. For example, if the requirement of considera-
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could be based on either conventional contract theory or on section 90 of the
first Restatement. 47 Here, a court pursuing a normal contract approach
could elect either to base liability on the traditional elements of an enforcea48
ble contract, or to satisfy these elements through promissory estoppel.
Since the latter inquiry will be much the same at each step in the process, it
seems more economical to base liability on a single, across-the-board, application of promissory estoppel. Thus, a court in our hypothetical jurisdiction
would be left with two general routes for establishing promissory liability:
traditional contract theory and a one-shot application of promissory estoppel. This approach is equivalent to saying that promissory estoppel's increasing use within the conventional contract framework creates strong
logical pressure to regard the doctrine as a theory of recovery distinct from
49
contract.
To the authors' knowledge, no court has made the sort of argument just
advanced. Increasingly, however, both commentators and courts accept the
result to which it apparently leads. Although the subject is rarely discussed
at any length, the professional literature for years has suggested promissory
estoppel's emergence as an independent cause of action. 50 As for the courts,
tion is more easily displaced by estoppel than the requirement of a writing, the court could
presumably achieve uniformity by employing the more stringent estoppel test used in statute of
frauds cases to the consideration element. Presumably, the weaker consideration test would be
satisfied whenever the statute of frauds test is satisfied, but not vice versa.
47. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
48. There is, however, some scattered authority for the proposition that courts should not
use promissory estoppel where the plaintiff can recover in contract. See, e.g., Guaranty Bank
v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (promissory estoppel not applicable where promise part of valid contract); Kramer v.
Alpine Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 422-26, 321 N.W.2d 293, 295-97 (1982) (clearly holding
that existence of contract will not bar estoppel claim where contract fails to spell out parties'
total business relationship, but suggesting that estoppel claim would fail were contract comprehensive). For reasons that will become apparent below, however, the authors fail to see why
the hypothetical jurisdiction would want to adopt such a limitation. The limitation is apparently losing force in any event. Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel- Contract
Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 908 (1985) (courts increasingly
rely on estoppel even where no barrier to recovery under conventional contract theory exists).
49. One other possible implication of this argument is that contract law itself should be
reconceptualized around the idea of reliance. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 534-36
(criticizing this idea).
50. E.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 33, § 6-10, at 213 (entitled in part: "Is
Promissory Estoppel a Non-Contractual Cause of Action?"); G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at
66, 67 (noting recent cases that suggest that estoppel does not constitute contract liability);
Farber & Matheson, supra note 48, at 908 ("courts are now comfortable enough with the
doctrine to use it as a primary basis of enforcement"); Knapp, supra note 1, at 53-54 (suggesting that protection of promise-induced reliance amounts to "the imposition of a distinct
kind of liability, with its own theory, and perhaps subject to its own legal rules"). The authors
have suggested the possibility on several occasions. Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel
and the Evolution of ContractLaw, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 184-93 (1980); Metzger & Phillips,
supra note 4, at 508-36; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 34, at 88-89; Metzger, supra note 39, at
1419-21. For an earlier argument along these lines, see Shattuck, GratuitousPromises: 4 New
Writ?, 35 MICH.L. REV. 908 (1937). Two student efforts suggest that promissory estoppel has
attained independent theory status in their jurisdictions. See Comment, Promissory EstoppelThe Basis of a Cause ofAction Which is Neither Contract, Tort, or [sic] Quasi-Contract,40 Mo.
L. REV. 163 (1975); Comment, Promissory Estoppel in Washington, 55 WASH. L. REV. 795
(1980).
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we have considered promissory estoppel's de facto emergence as an independent theory of recovery at length elsewhere, and cannot repeat the performance here. 5 1 Instead, we will briefly summarize the most important
a separate cause
reasons for our belief that promissory estoppel is becoming
52
of action before providing one concrete example.
A theory of recovery or cause of action can be defined as a group of factual elements that will enable a plaintiff to obtain some kind of legal relief if
they occur together and are proven. 53 A cause of action is independent of
other theories if its elements differ from the elements of those theories.
Traditional contract law and Restatement section 90 obviously state different tests of recovery when considered in a vacuum. But this point, while
probably necessary to any claim that promissory estoppel is attaining independent theory status, is hardly sufficient, since it begs the question of how
estoppel is being used by the courts.
At least suggestive in resolving the question of whether section 90 states a
separate cause of action are the terms courts sometimes use to describe
promissory estoppel. Recent decisions, for example, have called the doctrine
an "action," '5 4 a "cause of action,"5 5 a "theory,"' 56 a "basis for recovery" and
a "legitimate source of recovery,"'57 an "alternative theory of recovery,"58
the "basis of an action for damages," 5 9 and something under which one can
establish a "prima facie case." 6 The cases that use the promissory estoppel
to circumvent the statute of frauds by arguing that the statute of frauds provision in question covers only contracts and that promissory estoppel recovery is not contractual have greater persuasive value. 6 1 Still more persuasive
51. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 508-36.
52. The differences between the remedies available in promissory estoppel cases and those
available in contract cases might be adduced as an additional reason to argue that promissory
estoppel is becoming a separate cause of action. See infra note 94. The availability of reliancebased recoveries in contract cases not involving promissory estoppel weakens this argument,
however. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344(b), 349 (1981); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 33, § 14-4, at 522 & § 14-9, at 532-33. For a suggestion
that the reliance and expectation interests often coincide, see Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 73-75 (1936).
53. Eg., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ("averment of facts sufficient
to justify a court in rendering a judgment" and "concurrence of the facts giving rise to [an]
enforceable claim").
1985).
54. E.g., United States v. Iverson, 609 F. Supp. 927, 929-30 (N.D. Ill.
55. E.g., id. at 930; Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 697, 133 N.W.2d
267, 274 (1965).
56. Eg., Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1984) (referring to contract
and promissory estoppel as "theories" suitable for recovering damages).
57. Allen v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 606 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1979) (but stating that this is
not true in statute of frauds cases).
58. Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transp. Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 268,
275, 137 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859 (1977).
59. Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 255, 259, 616 P.2d 644,
646 (1980).
60. Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Alaska 1983) (also referring to plaintiff's separate contract claim in exactly same language).
61. E.g., Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687, 697 (W.D. Wis.
1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The statute of frauds relates to the enforceability of
contracts; promissory estoppel relates to promises which have no contractual basis and are
enforced only when necessary to avoid injustice.") (emphasis in original); see also R.S. Bennett
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are the decisions in which promissory estoppel was the only theory pleaded
or discussed, contract law was not mentioned, and the plaintiff's promissory

estoppel claim withstood a demurrer. 62 Also of considerable weight are decisions where the court separately treats the plaintiff's contract and promissory estoppel claims. 63 Lest it be thought that estoppel's separate treatment

is only a technicality, some cases of this sort deny recovery under contract
law while making recovery actually or potentially available under promissory estoppel. 64

The decisions effectively making promissory estoppel an independent theory of recovery are not yet overwhelming in number, and they tend to be
concentrated in a few states. 65 Their significance lies in their radical break
with tradition and in what this portends for the future of promissory liability. The cases in question, however, display little judicial awareness of the
step they are taking and its importance. 66 One partial exception to this last
generalization, and perhaps the best known promissory estoppel case of the
last twenty-five years, is the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 67 Because Hoffman is so familiar, and because it so
articulately exemplifies promissory estoppel's emergence as a separate cause
of action, detailed consideration of the case follows.
In the Hoffman case, Hoffman and his wife relied on Red Owl's various
promises to Hoffman that it would give him a grocery store franchise. Hoffman, among other things, sold a bakery and another grocery store, and
moved to the location of the planned franchised store. The first two questions considered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in an opinion affirming
the lower court's verdict for the Hoffmans were: (1) "[w]hether this court
& Co. v. Economy Mech. Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 184-88 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that statute of
frauds no longer provides complete bar to recovery on estoppel theory after rejecting plaintiff's
contract claim on statute of frauds grounds); N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319
F.2d 736, 740 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that no contract was created, remanding case to
district court to consider promissory estoppel liability, and declaring statute of frauds issue no
longer germane because no contract present). For further discussion of Litterio, see supra note
43.
62. See Insilco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 248 Ga. 322, 283 S.E.2d 262 (1981); Higgins
Constr. Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 276 S.C. 663, 666, 281 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1981) ("a
cause of action for promissory estoppel is stated").
63. See, e.g., R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 184-88
(7th Cir. 1979); Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198, 1202-03 (Alaska 1983); Vigoda v. Denver
Urban Renewal Auth., 624 P.2d 895, 897-98 (Colo. App. 1980); cf Schuhl v. United States, 3
Cl. Ct. 207, 210-11 (1983) (promissory estoppel claim cannot be brought against United States
under Tucker Act because promissory estoppel not express or implied-in-fact contract theory).
64. See, e.g., R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Economy Mechanical Indus., 606 F.2d 182, 184-88
(7th Cir. 1979); Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776, 781 (D. Colo. 1982); see
also Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580, 582-84 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court rejected
plaintiff's contract claim but granted his promissory estoppel claim, and court of appeals affirmed solely on estoppel grounds).
65. For a fairly complete listing and case description as of the summer of 1982, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 513-28. See also Werner, 732 F.2d at 582-84 (rejecting contract
claim but upholding estoppel claim); Glover, 667 P.2d at 1202-03 (upholding promissory estoppel claim and contract claim).
66. "That judicial ignorance is one of the great motivating forces of law reform has, of
course, long been an open secret." G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 57.
67. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
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should recognize causes of action grounded on promissory estoppel"; and (2)
whether "the facts in this case make out a cause of action for promissory
estoppel. ' ' 68 While answering the first question in the affirmative, 69 the
court stated: "Not only did the trial court frame [its] special verdict on the
theory of [section 90], but no other possible theory has been presented to or
discovered by this court which would permit plaintiffs to recover. ' '70 Turning to the second question posed above, the court first concluded that Red
Owl had made various promises to Hoffman, that he had reasonably relied
on these promises, and that he had fulfilled the conditions attached to
71
them.
Red Owl's major argument was contractual in nature. Red Owl claimed,
and the jury had found, 72 that an "agreement was never reached on essential
73
factors necessary to establish a contract between Hoffman and Red Owl."
The court stated:
This poses the question of whether the promise necessary to sustain a
cause of action for promissory estoppel must embrace all essential details of a proposed transaction between promisor and promisee so as to
be the equivalent of an offer that would result in a binding74contract
between the parties if the promisee were to accept the same.
Answering this question in the negative, the court then declared that section
90 "does not impose the requirement that the promise giving rise to the
cause of action must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the
' '75
promisee.
Thus far, the court's opinion might still be characterized, albeit with difficulty, as one where liability really was based on contract and promissory
estoppel merely cured a defective offer. But the court soon rejected any such
idea by stating that: "We deem it would be a mistake to regard an action
grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of contract
action."'76 Later, it nailed home the point by declaring that "this is not a
68. Id. at 693, 133 N.W.2d at 272-73. The third question considered by the court, Hoffman's and his wife's damages, assumes some importance later in this Article. See infra notes
155-156 and accompanying text.
69. See id. at 694-96, 133 N.W.2d at 273-74.
70. Id. at 694, 133 N.W.2d at 273. The court then stated that of the other remedies
considered, fraud and deceit seemed to be the most comparable, but found them inapplicable.

Id. A contract recovery was impossible because Red Owl's various "offers" were too indefinite. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.

71. Id. at 696-97, 133 N.W.2d at 274. There is no obvious reason why a promise giving
rise to promissory estoppel liability cannot be conditional, or why the plaintiffs ability to
recover under that theory may not depend on his fulfillment of the promisor's conditions. See
Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 6-8
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (plaintiff did not satisfy the promisor's conditions), arffd in part and vacated
in part, 631 F.2d 1264, 1277-79 (6th Cir. 1980).

72. Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 692, 133 N.W.2d at 272.
73. Id. at 697, 133 N.W.2d at 274.
74. Id., 133 N.W.2d at 274-75.
75. Id. at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275. Next, the court stated the elements of§ 90 recovery to
emphasize the point. Id.

76. Id.
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breach of contract action." 77
D. Promissory Estoppel in the Second Restatement
For the most part, the developments discussed above were fairly well advanced by the time the Restatement (Second) of Contracts appeared in 1981.
The new Restatement put its imprimatur on several of them. 78 Three of the
Second Restatement's provisions involve specific instances where promissory
estoppel can serve as a substitute for consideration. Section 87(2) uses the
doctrine to make certain offers irrevocable. 79 Section 88 makes promissory
estoppel one basis for enforcing promises to act as a surety.80 Section 89
uses promissory estoppel to enforce a promise modifying a duty under an
executory contract, 8 ' thus circumventing the traditional rule that a promise
to perform a preexisting contractual obligation is not consideration.8 2 As for
the statute of frauds, section 139 of the new Restatement creates an elaborate factor-based mechanism for using promissory estoppel to avoid its writing requirement.8 3 The Second Restatement also makes reliance a basis for
77. Id. at 701, 133 N.W.2d at 276 (using the statement to argue that lost profits were not
recoverable).
78. For a comprehensive examination of promissory estoppel under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, see Knapp, supra note 1.
79. "An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid
injustice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981).
80. A promise to be surety for the performance of a contractual obligation, made
to the obligee, is binding if ...(c) the promisor should reasonably expect the
promise to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of
the promisee or a third person, and the promise does induce such action or
forbearance.
Id. § 88(c).
81. "A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is
binding ...(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of
position in reliance on the promise." Id. § 89(c); see also infra note 83 (quoting the related
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 150 (1981)).
82. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 comment b (1981). See id. § 73 &
comment c; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 33, § 4-8 (general discussion of preexisting
obligation as consideration).
83. (1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particulary cancellation
and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of
the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise
established by clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the
promisor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981). The Second Restatement also states:
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enforcing an indefinite agreement. 84
The Second Restatement, however, has little to say about the use of promissory estoppel as an independent theory of recovery. One comment to the
new section 90 declares that the section "states a basic principle which often
renders inquiry unnecessary as to the precise scope of the policy of enforcing
bargains, ' 85 but another states that "[a] promise binding under this section
is a contract."'86 The text of section 90 itself continues the generality of its
predecessor. Its main provision, section 90(1), states that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted
87
for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Section 90(2) makes charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements enforceable under section 90(1) "without proof that the promise induced ac88
tion or forbearance."
The most important changes made by the new section 90 are its deletion
of the requirement that the reliance be "definite and substantial, '8 9 and the
possibility of partial enforcement created by its statement that the remedy
may be limited as justice requires. 9° The drafters of the Second Restatement
saw these two changes as linked. 9 1 Under the previous version of section 90,
the drafters apparently envisioned that full enforcement of the expectation
created by the promise would be the standard remedy and that definite and
substantial reliance was needed to justify this. Under the new section 90,
however, less in the way of reliance seems necessary because the court can
limit the remedy as justice requires. 92 Section 90's comments have relatively
little to say about the nature and degree of reliance now required for recovWhere the parties to an enforceable contract subsequently agree that all or part
of a duty need not be performed or of [sic] a condition need not occur, the
Statute of Frauds does not prevent enforcement of the subsequent agreement if
reinstatement of the original terms would be unjust in view of a material change
of position in reliance on the subsequent agreement.

Id. § 150.
84. "Action in reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate
even though uncertainty is not removed." Id. § 34(3).

85. Id. § 90 comment a.
86. Id. comment d. Comment a to § 139 appears to identify § 90 as a provision making
promissory estoppel a consideration substitute. Id. § 139 comment a.

87. Id. § 90(1).
88. Id. § 90(2).
89. See supra text following note 25.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment d (1981).
91. See id. § 90 Reporter's Note (1981); see also ALl, 42D ANNUAL MEETING, PROCEEDINGS 296-97 (1965) [hereinafter ALT PROCEEDINGS].

92.

This deletion responds to the argument of Fuller and Perdue that the section
as originally drafted appeared to require the promisee's reliance to have been
"definite and substantial" enough to justify full enforcement of the expectation

created by the promise; the drafters seem to have assumed that retention of that
language would undercut the new policy of permitting partial enforcement.
Knapp, supra note 1, at 58 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original) (stating drafters' apparent

view before later raising some questions about it).
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ery. 93 Comment d, however, does list the many kinds of remedies currently
possible under section 90.94
Section 90's comments also flesh out the amorphous "if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise" language of section 90(1). 95
Comment b states that satisfaction of this requirement may depend on the
reasonableness of the promisee's reliance;96 its definite and substantial character in relation to the remedy sought; the formality with which the promise
was made; the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent, and
channeling functions of form are met; 97 and the extent to which such other
policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant. 98 Finally, the new section 90 and its comments9 9 expressly make foreseeable third-party reliance a basis for enforcing promises,
and thus raise the possibility that third parties may be able to recover under
promissory estoppel. We now turn to this possibility.

II.

RELIANCE AND THIRD PARTIES

During its twentieth century march through (and beyond) contract law,
promissory estoppel has operated almost exclusively in the promisor-promisee context. Throughout the doctrine's many triumphs, the defendant communicated a promise to the plaintiff, who was the promisee of that promise.
93.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981) makes the "definite

and substantial character [of the reliance] in relation to the remedy sought" one factor a court

should consider in determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 97. Comment b also states that: "The force of
particular factors varies in different types of cases: thus reliance need not be of substantial
character in charitable subscription cases, but must in cases of firm offers and guaranties."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981) (citing §§ 87, 88, & 90(2)).
For an argument that some courts now require little or no tangible reliance in promissory
estoppel cases, see Farber & Matheson, supra note 48, at 910-14.
94. The remedies include "full-scale enforcement by normal [contract] remedies"; and
restitution, damages, or specific relief "measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance rather
than by the terms of the promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment d
(1981). The comment also states that damages usually "should not put the promisee in a
better position than performance of the promise would have put him," and that in gift promise
cases it is rarely proper to award consequential damages that place a greater burden on the
promisor than performance of the promise would have imposed. Id. Several authors have
recently considered promissory estoppel damages. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 8, at 686-88;
Knapp, supra note 1, at 55-58; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 498-500. See also Comment, Once More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and TraditionalDamage Doctrine, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 559 (1970) (earlier and more detailed discussion of damages). Commentators
have suggested that courts now tend to award full expectation damages rather than reliance
damages. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 48, at 909.

95. Restatement (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
96. The distinction between the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance and its foreseeability to the promisor is often quite tenuous. See infra notes 282-284 and accompanying text.
97. See Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
98. The comment also adds that "[tihe force of particular factors varies in different types
of cases."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981).

99. Id. comment c; see infra text following note 162. Sections 88(c) and 139 likewise refer
to third-party reliance. See supra notes 80, 83. Also, comment d to § 89 states that a promise
modifying an executory contract "may become binding in whole or in part by reason of action
or forbearance by the promisee or third persons in reliance on it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 89 comment d (1981).
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But as section 90 of the Second Restatement suggests, and as our subsequent
discussion reveals, promissory estoppel has found application as well in
claims by relying third parties. For reasons that should become evident, this
development is of considerable intrinsic importance. This development also
bears upon the accuracy of the claim that promissory estoppel is becoming
an independent theory of recovery.
The cases extending promissory estoppel liability to third parties have
many of the indicia of independent theory status discussed above.1° ° In
some of these decisions, that is, suggestive terms like "theory" and "cause of
action" are used to describe the estoppel claim. 0 1 In a few, separate contract and estoppel claims proceed side-by-side.' 0 2 And in many, promissory
estoppel is the only apparent basis of recovery.103 At first glance, however,
these cases arguably fail a test of independent theory status that posed no
problems when considered earlier: the requirement that a truly "independent" cause of action have different elements of recovery than its competitors.' ° 4 Reliance has become a factor to be considered in conventional
contract claims by third-party beneficiaries. 10 5 This raises the possibility
that the tests for third-party promissory estoppel recovery and third-party
beneficiary recovery are basically congruent. Alternatively, the practical results may still be much the same under each theory. If the former surmise is
accurate, promissory estoppel's overall claim to independent theory status is
diminished somewhat. In the latter case, the independence of the action is
rendered less significant.
Thus, this section has two general aims. The first is to examine the cases
dealing with promissory estoppel liability to third parties. The second is to
determine these cases' effect on the argument that promissory estoppel is
becoming an independent theory of recovery. Since the second question depends on a comparison between promissory estoppel and third-party beneficiary law, the section begins by examining the use of reliance in third-party
beneficiary claims. After considering promissory estoppel in the third-party
context, the section assesses the independent theory argument by comparing
these two bodies of law and the results obtainable under each. The section
concludes with a discussion of the relationship between contract law and
promissory estoppel in third-party situations.
A.

Reliance in the Third-PartyBeneficiary Context

In the typical third-party beneficiary case, the third party sues for breach
of a promise made by the promisor as part of a contract with the promisee. 0 6 Commentators often say that the general test for third-party recov100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See
See
See
See
See

supra text
supra text
supra text
supra text
supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

53-77.
54-60.
63-64.
62, 64.
53-54.

105. See infra text accompanying notes 106-146.
106. Some of these situations can be conceptualized as promissory estoppel cases. In the

typical third-party beneficiary case, the promisee furnishes some consideration to the prom-
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ery under a contract 10 7 is the contracting parties' intention that the third
party benefit substantially from the promised performance' 0 8 Sometimes,
however, the promisee's intention seems to have been determinative.l°9 Traditionally, moreover, the third party recovers only when the third party
qualifies as a donee beneficiary or a creditor beneficiary.° 10 The third party
is a donee beneficiary when the promisee intends that the promisor's promise

be a gift to the third party, and a creditor beneficiary when performance of
the promise will satisfy some debt, obligation, or duty the promisee owes to
the third party."' Third-party beneficiaries who are unable to qualify as
donee or creditor beneficiaries are incidental beneficiaries, and cannot rel 2
cover on the contract."
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts departs from the traditional
scheme somewhat, at least with respect to terminology. 1 3 Section 304 of
the Restatement (Second) declares that "[a] promise in a contract creates a
duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and
the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty. ' 14 Section 302(1) of the new
Restatement provides the following definition of the term "intended
beneficiary":
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention
of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
isor, in exchange for the promisor's promise to render some performance to a third party. L.
SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 241 (2d ed. 1965). Where the third party

relies on the promisor's promise, the case could be conceptualized as a promissory estoppel
action. Here, § 90 tests would control the third party's recovery, and the court would apply
these tests relative to the third party rather than the promisee. At present, however, our concern is with the role reliance plays in the third-party beneficiary context.
107. The promisor and promisee must be parties to a contract. See, e.g., Beaumont v.
American Can Co., 797 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1986) (third party's recovery denied because no
contract between promisor and promisee); Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc., 78 N.C.
App. 334, 337-38, 337 S.E.2d 132, 134-35 (1985) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 comment b (1981) ("the requirements for formation of a contract must of course
be met").
108. E.g., L. SIMPSON, supra note 106, at 246; Prince, Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule under Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,25 B.C.L. REV.
919, 923 (1984).
109. CompareL. SIMPSON, supra note 106, at 246-47 (arguing that promisor's intent generally irrelevant and promisee's intent determinative) with Prince, supra note 108, at 931 (stating
that some jurisdictions require only proof of promisee's intent, some require intent of both
promisor and promisee, and a few require that promisor have reason to know that promisee
intended to contract for third-party rights).
110. E.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 715 (1982); L. SIMPSON, supra note 106, at 241,
242.
111. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133(1)(a), (b) (1932); E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 110, at 715; L. SIMPSON, supra note 106, at 242-44.
112. E.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, at 715; L. SIMPSON, supra note 106, at 245.
113. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, at 716.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
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beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.' 1 5
Contract beneficiaries who do not qualify as intended beneficiaries are7
termed "incidental beneficiaries," ' 16 and acquire no rights in the contract. "
For present purposes, we need not consider the details of section 302's
application or the exact degree to which it reflects existing law. Instead, it is
sufficient to note that the rules just quoted almost certainly do not mark a
radical break with the past.' 18 One commentator, for example, regards subsections (a) and (b) of section 302(1) as similar to the traditional categories
of creditor and donee beneficiary.' '9 Comment d to section 302, however,
departs from prior law' 20 by introducing the reliance element lacking in the
section's text.' 2' In relevant part, comment d to section 302 provides:
Other Intended Beneficiaries. Either a promise to pay the promisee's
debt to a beneficiary or a gift promise involves a manifestation of intention by the promisee and promisor sufficient, in a contractual setting, to
make reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable. Other
cases may be quite similar in this respect. Examples are a promise to
perform a supposed or asserted duty of the promisee, a promise to discharge a lien on the promisee's property, or a promise to satisfy the
duty of a third person. In such cases, if the beneficiary would be reaan intention to confer a
sonable in relying on the promise as manifesting
22
right on him, he is an intended beneficiary.'
At first blush, comment d might be regarded as yet another Restatement
(Second) application of promissory estoppel to an area formerly governed by
traditional contract principles. Read literally, however, the comment differs
from section 90 by not requiring actual reliance by the third party. 12 3 In
115. Id. § 302(1).

116. Id. § 302(2).
117. Id.§ 315.
118. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 108, at 925 n.31 (quoting various judicial views on the
impact of § 302, many of which regard § 302 as consistent with prior law); Note, Third Party
Beneficiariesand the Intention Standard: A Search for Rational Contract Decision-Making,54
VA. L. REV. 1166, 1169-70 (1968) (newness of Restatement's intent test questionable, since
courts have long used intent in third-party beneficiary cases).
119. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, at 717. On the differences and similarities between
these subsections and the traditional categories, see id. at 717-24.
120. Prince, supra note 108, at 987 (comment d "a significant . . . departure from the
popular construction of the original Restatement").
121. Another reliance-based Restatement (Second) provision, § 311(3), states that the
power of the promisor and promisee to discharge or modify the agreement terminates when
the beneficiary materially changes position in justifiable reliance on the promise before receiving notice of the discharge or modification. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 311(3) (1981). Here, however, the beneficiary is already an intended beneficiary. Id.
§ 311(1) & comment g. Thus, § 311(3) does not apply here.
122. Id. § 302 comment d. The remainder of the comment goes as follows:
Where there is doubt whether such reliance would be reasonable, considerations
of procedural convenience and other factors not strictly dependent on the manifested intention of the parties may affect the question whether under Subsection
(1) recognition of a right in the beneficiary is appropriate. In some cases an
overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute, requires recognition of
such a right without regard to the intention of the parties.
Id.
123. Id. Instead, comment d speaks of a promise "sufficient ... to make reliance by the
beneficiary both reasonable and probable," and renders the third party an intended beneficiary
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each of comment d's six illustrations, moreover, the third party was an in124
tended beneficiary even though no actual reliance was specifically stated.
What, then, are the aim and impact of comment d? In all likelihood, comment d introduces reasonable and probable reliance only as means of measuring the contracting parties' intent to benefit the third party. The typical
test for intent involves an objective standard under which the contract terms
and the surrounding circumstances are assessed from the standpoint of the
reasonable person. 125 Much the same standpoint underlies comment d's required determination that the promise make third-party reliance reasonable.' 26 Where the contract language and the surrounding circumstances
reasonably indicate an intention to benefit the third party, for instance, the
third party may often reasonably rely. Also, "arguing that reliance is justifiable would be difficult when the terms and circumstances fail to give some
basis for concluding that recognition of third-party rights is consistent with
the goals of the contracting parties."' 27 For these reasons, one author argues that comment d's reliance language basically duplicates the intent test
128
traditionally employed in third-party beneficiary cases.
Although there are a few apparent dissenters,129 most of the courts specifically considering the matter allow a third party's reliance to play some role
in determining that party's rights under the contract.130 A few of these cases
appear to follow the authors' reading of comment d by using the promise's
ability to provoke reasonable third-party reliance as a gauge of the parties'
only when he "would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to
confer a right on him." Id. (emphasis added). Less easy to classify, however, is id. § 304
comment e (in cases of doubt, whether intention to benefit third party to be attributed to
promisee "may be influenced by the likelihood that recognition of the right will... protect the
beneficiary in his reasonable reliance on the promise").
124. See id. § 302 illustrations 10-15.
125. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 33, at 611.
126. Hereafter, we focus on the operative sentence of comment d: "If the beneficiary would
be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him, he
is an intended beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 comment d
(1981). Thus, from now on, the Article ignores the comment's earlier reference to "probable"
reliance.
127. Prince, supra note 108, at 988.
128. Id. at 987, 988.
129. E.g., White v. Alaska Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 592 P.2d 367, 369 (Alaska 1979) (third party
"cannot make himself a creditor beneficiary merely by acting in reliance upon a contract");
Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 36 Cal. 3d 426, 437 n.5, 682 P.2d 1100, 1105 n.5, 204 Cal. Rptr.
435, 440 n.5 (1984) (one determined not to be third-party beneficiary cannot acquire rights in
contract by acting in reliance on it).
130. See, e.g., Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 941-42 (11th Cir. 1983); Commercial Ins.
Co. v. Pacific-Peru Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1977); Taylor Woodrow
Blitman Constr. Corp. v. Southfield Gardens Co., 534 F. Supp. 340, 343-44 (D. Mass. 1982);
Weninegar v. S.S. Steele & Co., 477 So. 2d 949, 955-56 (Ala. 1985); Harris v. Board of Water
& Sewer Comm'rs, 294 Ala. 606, 611, 320 So. 2d 624, 628 (1975); Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., 386
Mass. 187, 195 n.3, 435 N.E.2d 628, 633 n.3 (1982); Gilmore v. Century Bank & Trust Co., 20
Mass. App. Ct. 49, 477 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (1985); Lipshie v. Tracy Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 370, 379,
566 P.2d 819, 824-25 (1977); Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 66
N.Y.2d 38, 44, 45-46, 485 N.E.2d 208, 212-13, 495 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-6 (1985); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Rapistan, Inc., 472 Pa. 36, 45-46, 371 A.2d 178, 182-83 (1976); cf
Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1977) (one element of test for
third-party beneficiary status whether third party's expectations of benefit reasonable).
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intent.13 Perhaps the clearest example is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Rapistan Inc., 32 which
involved a contract whereby Rapistan was to construct and install a conveyor system in the Liquor Control Board's (PLCB's) Philadelphia warehouse. Later, after relying on Rapistan's conveyor system specifications in
computing its bid, a third party named Holt contracted with the PLCB to
operate the warehouse. The system failed to perform as promised, and Holt
incurred additional expenses as a result. In concluding that Holt was not an
intended beneficiary of the PLCB-Rapistan contract, the court cited comment d, reading it as requiring "evidence, sufficient to permit reasonable reliance, that the promisee and promisor intended to confer a right on the third
party." 1 33 Here, though, there was no indication that either party intended
this result. At most, Rapistan was merely aware that some third party
would operate its conveyor system, and the contract made no mention of any
third-party beneficiary.' 34 Moreover, "[n]owhere in the contract or the
complaint is it shown or alleged that the PLCB intended to use Rapistan's
promise to build the conveyor system to discharge a contractual duty to a
third party."' 35 For these reasons, "Holt could not reasonably assume that
' 36
the parties intended to confer on it a right to Rapistan's performance."'
Nowhere in this portion of its opinion did the court consider Holt's actual
reliance.
131. In addition to the Rapistan case discussed below, two other decisions serve as possible
examples. In Rae v. Air Speed, Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 435 N.E.2d 628 (1982), a woman's husband died in the crash of his employer's plane. She successfully sued as beneficiary of a contract whereby an insurance agent had promised the employer to procure workers'
compensation insurance covering the employer's employees. Id. at 195, 435 N.E.2d at 633.
As an apparent alternative basis of recovery, the court noted that the employer had a statutory
duty to obtain workers' compensation insurance for its employees, and that comment d specifically mentions promises "to perform a supposed or asserted duty of the promisee .....Id. at
195 n.3, 435 N.E.2d at 633 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 comment d (1981)); see supra text accompanying note 122. The court also quoted comment d's
statement that the third party is an intended beneficiary if the third party would be reasonable
in relying on the promise as manifesting an intent to confer a right. Id. at 195 n.3, 435 N.E.2d
at 633 n.3.
In Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs, 294 Ala. 606, 320 So. 2d 624 (1975), the
third-party plaintiff (Harris) sued a public corporation that had contracted with the city of
Mobile to maintain an adequate supply of water to the city's fire hydrants. The plaintiffs
motel and restaurant were totally destroyed by fire because nearby fire hydrants did not contain water. In reversing a lower court decision denying recovery, the Alabama Supreme Court
declared: "[H]ow can itbe said that Harris is not the very party for whose benefit the contract
was made?... [I]n the end, the most direct benefit [of the contract] inures to the people of the
City, like Harris, who rely on these city-provided services for the protection of their property."
Id. at 611, 320 So. 2d at 628. This result, however, may be atypical. See E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 110, at 726-27 (discussing third-party beneficiary liability under contracts with government bodies and problems this presents).
132. 472 Pa. 36, 371 A.2d 178 (1976).
133. Id. at 46, 371 A.2d at 182. The court also cited comment d for the proposition that "a
third party is an intended beneficiary only if he can reasonably rely on the contract as manifesting an intent to confer a right on him." Id. at 45, 371 A.2d at 182.
134. Id. at 46, 371 A.2d at 183. The court did not, however, impose an absolute requirement that the contract expressly state the intent to benefit a third party. Id. at 44-45, 371 A.2d
at 182.
135. Id. at 46, 371 A.2d at 183.
136. Id.
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In Rapistan, therefore, the court's "reasonable reliance" inquiry differed
little from the customary intent-of-the-parties analysis. 137 Other cases, however, use reasonable reliance somewhat differently. Comment d to section
302 effectively states that the third party must be declared an intended beneficiary if he would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an
intention to confer a right on him.' 38 Nevertheless, some courts merely consider the reasonableness of the third party's reliance one factor in determining intended beneficiary status.' 39 In such cases the court considers the
normal "intent" tests for intended beneficiary status along with the justifiability of reliance.' 4° For example, Beverly v. Macy' 4' involved a suit by a
third party whose flood insurance had lapsed after the insurer failed to send
premium due and termination notices as required by its contract with the
company servicing the insured's property. Reversing a district court judgment for the defendant insurer, the court of appeals concluded that the
plaintiff had reasonably relied on the defendant's past dispatch of premium
notices in assuming that this practice would continue. 42- The court explained that "[w]hile this reliance, by itself, would not allow a court to read
into the contract terms that do not exist,... [the plaintiff's] conduct when

combined with the express obligations incorporated into that contract
strongly suggests that she was a direct beneficiary rather than an incidental
43
one." 1
As the preceding quotation makes apparent, Beverly v. Macy also departed
from a literal reading of comment d by considering actual reliance. Other
courts have done the same. 44 Since a promise on which the third party
would be reasonable in relying is also likely to induce actual reliance, and
since such reliance apparently occurred in the cases in question, the courts'
consideration of actual reliance is understandable and perhaps inevitable. 145
In some cases, however, the nature and degree of the third party's actual
reliance seem to have been at least as significant as its reasonableness.' 46
137. See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text accompanying note 122.
139. E.g., Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 941 (11th Cir. 1983) (actual and reasonable
reliance "a significant factor"); Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 66
N.Y.2d 38, 44, 485 N.E.2d 208, 212, 495 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1985) (reasonableness and
probability of third party's reliance among the circumstances warranting consideration); cf
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1977) (comment d
"further refines" identification of third-party beneficiary); Weninegar v. S.S. Steele & Co., 477
So. 2d 949, 955 (Ala. 1985) (discussing and relying upon Beverly v. Macy); Gilmore v. Century
Bank & Trust Co., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 477 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (1985) (third parties' actual
reliance "fortified their trustee's right to sue").
140. See, e.g., Gilmore, 477 N.E.2d at 1074-75; Fourth Ocean, 66 N.Y.2d at 44-46, 485
N.E.2d at 211-13, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 4-6.
141. 702 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1983).
142. See id. at 941.
143. Id. at 941-42 (citation omitted).
144. See, e.g., Commercial Ins. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 954 (9th
Cir. 1977); Gilmore, 477 N.E.2d at 1074; Fourth Ocean, 66 N.Y.2d at 46, 485 N.E.2d at 213,
495 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
145. In addition, one reading of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 comment
e might justify the courts' consideration of actual reliance. See supra note 123.
146. In Gilmore the court found that the claimants' actual reliance "fortified their trustee's
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Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties

From the perspective of a relying third party seeking recovery for that
reliance, the cases just discussed are half-measures at best. Under a literal
reading of comment d to section 302, a third party need not show actual
reliance, thus somewhat easing the evidentiary burden. This benefit is trivial, however, because the party in question will in fact have relied. Moreover, the most likely reason for this surface advantage is that the drafters
aimed comment d less at protecting third-party reliance than at using the
reasonableness of such reliance to ascertain the intent of the contracting parties. 14 7 As a result, comment d, read literally, probably does not diverge
much from existing third-party beneficiary law.148 If the Rapistan case provides guidance, the intent measured by the reasonableness of the third
party's reliance is a specific intention to benefit a third party. 149 To be sure,
some courts do not follow comment d slavishly.' 50 But while these courts
consider the third party's actual reliance along with the reasonableness of
that reliance, these factors do not control the outcome, but only constitute
items the court considers along with traditional intent tests.15' Finally, for
comment d to serve as a basis of promissory liability, the promisor and the
152
promisee must have a contract.
1. The Early Cases
From a pro-reliance standpoint, the promissory estoppel cases involving
claims by third parties are generally more encouraging than third-party beneficiary cases. The original version of Restatement section 90 failed to extend promissory estoppel liability to third parties. 153 This omission,
however, did not prevent the courts from occasionally allowing such recoveries. 154 In Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 155 one contested item of damright to sue" under

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 302(l)(a) (1981). 477 N.E.2d

at 1074. After quoting comment d, the court concluded that because the claimants "in fact
relied, and with reason" by giving up various legal rights, their trustee was also entitled to
recover under § 302(1)(b). Id. at 1074; see supra text accompanying note 115 (substance of
§ 302(1)); see also Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 66 N.Y.2d 38, 4446, 485 N.E.2d 208, 213, 495 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1985) (factors in third party's failure to recover
include absence of evidence that reliance was reasonable and probable, plus absence of evidence that plaintiff in fact relied).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 120-128.
148. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 133-134. Comment d states that the third party is
an intended beneficiary if he "would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an
intention to confer a right on him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 comment
d (1981) (emphasis added).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 138-146.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 143-146.
152. See supra note 107.
153. See supra text accompanying note 26.
154. A much-cited early example occurring before promulgation of the First Restatement
is the California Supreme Court's decision in Burgess v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
210 Cal. 180, 290 P. 1029 (1930). In that case, the defendant lender made a written promise
that, in exchange for $6000, it would release certain land from a deed of trust securing a loan
the defendant had made to the promisee. At the time, the defendant knew that the promisee
needed this written promise to further a transaction with a third party. After telling the third
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ages was a $2000 loss resulting from the Hoffmans' sale of a bakery at Red
Owl's instigation to raise capital for the promised venture. Since Hoffman's
wife was half owner of the bakery, and since Red Owl had not dealt with
Mrs. Hoffman, Red Owl claimed that it was not liable for her share of the
loss. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, allowed Mrs. Hoffman to
recover.
Ordinarily only the promisee and not third persons are entitled to enforce the remedy of promissory estoppel against the promisor. However, if the promisor actually foresees, or has reason to foresee, action
by a third person in reliance on the promise, it may be quite unjust to
refuse to perform the promise .... Here not only did defendants foresee

that it would be necessary for Mrs. Hoffman to sell her joint interest in
the bakery building, but defendants actually requested that this be
done. 156
Also, Lear v. Bishop 157 the Nevada Supreme Court awarded a third party
specific performance under section 90 after that party had foreseeably and
reasonably relied on the defendant's promise to participate in the purchase
of some land.1 58 While doing so, though, the court limited the class of third
parties who could recover under section 90. "Although the doctrine [of]
promissory estoppel expressed in Section 90... is limited to cases in which
the action in reliance is on the part of the promisee .... an intended third
party beneficiary... should similarly be protected if its reliance was likewise
foreseeable." 159 The court thus combined elements of third-party beneficiary theory with promissory estoppel.
party that the property could be released from the first deed of trust for $6000, the promisee
obtained a loan from the third party. The third party took a second deed of trust on the
property to secure the loan, and received the defendant's release letter at the closing. Later,
the promisee went bankrupt, the defendant attached the property to satisfy the debt, the third
party tendered $6000 to the defendant demanding reconveyance of the property, and the defendant refused the tender. The court found for the third party, because "the effect of the
transaction was to supply a substitute for a consideration for this promise and to bring into
operation the well-known doctrine of estoppel." Id. at 188, 290 P. at 1032. Before so concluding, the court noted the defendant's knowledge of the general reason for the release, and the
third party's reliance on the promise. See id. at 186-87, 290 P. at 1031-32.
155. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). For additional discussion of Hoffman, see
supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 699, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
157. 86 Nev. 709, 476 P.2d 18 (1970).
158. The third party (C-B Ranch) was the seller of land under a contract with the Nevada
Department of Fish and Game (Fish and Game). The defendant (Lear) promised Fish and
Game that it would participate in the sale as a co-purchaser. See id. at 710-12, 476 P.2d at 1921 (detailing the complicated context within which this promise occurred). C-B Ranch
foreseeably and reasonably relied on Lear's promise by selling a portion of its land to Fish and
Game, thus severing its land holdings. Id. at 712, 714, 476 P.2d at 20, 22. Lear then refused
to sign a subsequent agreement under which C-B Ranch was to convey the remainder of its
property to Lear. Apparently, Lear's promise was not binding on a regular contract theory,
although the court did not discuss the point. The court did discuss Lear's claim that the
statute of frauds blocked recovery, but seemingly directed the discussion toward the contract
for sale of the land, not Lear's separate promise to participate in the deal. See id. at 713, 476
P.2d at 21.
159. Id. at 714, 476 P.2d at 22.
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Comment c to Section 90
By the early 1970s, the cases considering promissory estoppel liability to

third parties had the benefit of a tentative draft of the new section 90, which
brings third-party reliance within the section's protection.' 6° The draft on
which these courts relied does not differ from the present section 90(1).161
Proposed comment d further provided:
Reliance by third persons. If a promise is made to one party for the
benefit of another, it is often foreseeable that the beneficiary will rely on

the promise. Enforcement of the promise in such cases rests on the
same basis and depends on the same factors as in cases of reliance by
the promisee. Justifiable reliance by third persons who are not beneficiaries is less likely,162
but may sometimes reinforce the claim of the promisee or beneficiary.

This comment appears without change163in the final text of the Restatement
(Second), redesignated as comment c.
Comment c's meaning is anything but obvious. At first blush, it suggests

that new section 90, like the Nevada Supreme Court in Lear, limits recovery
to third parties who can qualify as intended beneficiaries under the Restatement (Second)'s third-party beneficiary provisions. 164 The comment identifies the relying third party as a "beneficiary."' 165 The "for the benefit of
another" language in its first sentence suggests that this beneficiary is an
intended beneficiary.1 66 Comment c's last sentence strongly implies that re-

lying third parties who are not such beneficiaries cannot recover on their
the ALI's Proceedings on
own behalf.' 67 Moreover, both commentators and
168
section 90 support this reading of comment c.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
161. Compare id. with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1965) (identical
text).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment c (1981).
164. On these provisions, see supra notes 113-124 and accompanying text.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment c (1981).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Note, Ravelo, supra note 7, at 174-76, 183; cf IA CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 200, at
219 (1963) (expressing similar view about scope of third-party recovery under promissory estoppel). The American Law Institute proceedings provide in part:
MR. TALBOT RAIN (Texas). Mr. Chaiman-Mr. Reporter, on the top of page
169 in Comment d you talk about reliance by third persons, and in the second
line you make reference to the situation where a promise is made to one party
for the benefit of another. My question is, is that use of the words "for the
benefit of another" unnecessarily limiting?
Back in section 89C you speak of a promise which is likely to induce action or
forbearance by a third person. It may not be for his benefit.
I have in mind a case where, for example, a bank is asked to lend money to a
college. They promise a gift for a building; and Comment (d), if that promise is
not made for the benefit of the thing, but is a promise which the contributor
knows is likely to induce action on the part of the lender-and you do not intend, I think, by the use of that word in the second line on page 169 that the
promise must be for the benefit of the college-he may rely and act even though
it is not for his benefit.
PROFESSOR BRAUCHER: I agree with you entirely, Mr. Rain. I thought we
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If comment c is limited to intended beneficiaries, however, it becomes redundant, since the Restatement (Second) already guarantees that such beneficiaries can enforce the promisor's promise. 169 In response, it might be
argued that comment c merely reiterates the new reliance-oriented tests for
intended beneficiary status contained in comment d to section 302.170 As
suggested above, however, comment d uses the reasonableness of the third
party's reliance to gauge the contracting parties' intent to benefit the third
party. 17 1 Comment c, in contrast, contemplates that section 90's tests will
172
control the third party's recovery.
Another nonredundant reading of comment c could say that it uses the
third party's reliance to cure defects in the agreement between the promisor
and the promisee.173 In the absence of a contract between the promisor and
promisee, third parties who otherwise would qualify as intended beneficiaries
174
cannot enforce the promisor's promise under third-party beneficiary law.
If, however, reliance by such parties satisfies the tests of section 90,175 that
had said in the first sentence that if the promise is made to one party for the

benefit of another there will be reliance. In that kind of case the beneficiary
stands on the same kind of footing as the promisee. Then I go on to say, "Justifiable reliance by third persons who are not beneficiaries is less likely, but may
sometimes reinforce the claim of the promisee or beneficiary."
Your case seems to me an example of where the bank is not a beneficiary or
an intended beneficiary of the promise to give money to the college, and yet the
fact that there is reliance may reinforce the college's claim. I think it's the last
sentence that was designed to deal with that.
MR. RAIN: That may be so. I had in mind the opportunity of enforcing
directly by the bank.
PROFESSOR BRAUCHER: Well, I think as to that the problem of reliance or
consideration is probably less significant than the question whether the bank was
an intended beneficiary of the promise; but I would be very skeptical whether
the bank was really a third party beneficiary to enforce a promise to make a gift
to the college, but-[at this point, another question intervened].
ALI PROCEEDINGS, supra note 91, at 300-01.

The hypothetical discussed by Professor Braucher and Mr. Rain could have been clearer,
but it seems to involve a contributor's (promisor's) promise to give money to a college (the
promisee), a promise on which a third-party bank somehow relied by making a loan. In any
event, Braucher's remarks strongly suggest his intent that comment d (now comment c) only
protect intended beneficiaries. Earlier, indeed, he had stated that the new § 90's inclusion of
third parties was "to provide for reliance by beneficiaries as well as reliance by promises [sic],"
and that this change "is entirely consistent with the chapter on third party beneficiaries in the
original Restatement." Id. at 297. The Restatement (Second)'s definition of the term "beneficiary," however, hardly supports the view that § 90 only protects intended beneficiaries. See
infra text accompanying notes 180-184.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
170. See supra text accompanying note 115 (substance of § 302); see also supra note 122
(substance of comment d to § 302).
171. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
172. "Enforcement of the promise in such cases rests on the same basis and depends on the
same factors as in cases of reliance by the promisee." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment c (1981).
173. This is the position the authors adopted in a previous article. Metzger & Phillips,
supra note 4, at 543 ("only third party beneficiaries of a contract made enforceable by estoppel
are to be protected"). For reasons that will become apparent shortly, we now doubt that this
interpretation was correct. Although we still cannot dismiss it completely.
174. See supra note 107 (contract between promisor and promisee needed for third-party
beneficiary recovery).
175. See supra text accompanying note 87 (text of § 90).
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reliance would, in effect, create the necessary contract between the promisor
and promisee and thus allow the intended beneficiary to recover.1 7 6 Thus
read, comment c is little more than a supplement to the Restatement (Second)'s third-party beneficiary rules. While some evidence supports this reading of comment C,177 the authors know of no authoritative source that
articulately enunciates it.178

In any event, the claim that comment c to section 90 protects only intended beneficiaries is subject to a more significant objection. The comment
simply uses the term "beneficiary" to describe the relying third party, and
fails to include the word "intended." 179 This omission is important because
section 2 of the Second Restatement defines a beneficiary as a person other
than the promisee who will benefit from performance of a promise.1 80 Comment g to that section elaborates by stating: "A beneficiary may or may not
have a legal right to performance; like 'promisee,' the term is neutral with
respect to rights and duties."''
If this definition is incorporated within
comment c, the comment seemingly includes all beneficiaries of the promise,
whether intended or incidental. 8 2 At least one court has adopted this reading of comment c. While reaffirming Hoffman's 83 extension of promissory
176. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 543.
177. The college hypothetical discussed by Professor Braucher and Mr. Rain suggests this
reading of comment c, since it appears that no consideration supports the contributor's gift
promise. See supra note 168. Illustration 6 to § 90 further supports this reading of comment
c:

A executes and delivers a promissory note to B, a bank, to give B a false appearance of assets, deceive the banking authorities, and enable the bank to continue
to operate. After several years B fails and is taken over by C, a representative of
B's creditors. A's note is enforceable by C.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illustration 6 (1981). Here, no consideration
supported A's note, yet C could recover. C might, however, qualify as an intended beneficiary
under Restatement (Second) § 302(1) or comment d to that section. A case supplies further
evidence for this reading of comment c. See Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc., 78 N.C.
App. 435, 337 S.E.2d 132 (1985) (discussed infra note 198). The court, however, denied the
third party's claim, arguably rejecting this reading of comment c in the bargain. Id.
178. This reading is also inconsistent with the general argument that promissory estoppel is
becoming an independent theory of recovery, since there is little reason to think that such a
theory would incorporate traditional contract tests of liability. See Metzger & Phillips, supra
note 4, at 543-44.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment c (1981).
180. Where performance will benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is a
beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(4) (1981).
181. Id. comment g. Comment a to § 302 basically repeats this point. Id. § 302 comment
a. Also, comment a adds that: "[e]ither promisee or beneficiary may but need not be connected with the transaction in other ways: neither promisee nor beneficiary is necessarily the
person to whom performance is to be rendered, the person who will receive economic benefit,
or the person who furnished the consideration." Id.
182. Professor Knapp so reads comment c. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 61. Professor
Knapp explains that "the text [of section 90] refers not only to third parties who are the
intended beneficiaries of a promised performance, but also to others who may foreseeably rely
on a promised performance in making expenditures or taking other action of their own." Id.
(citing comment c to § 90). Since comment c does limit third-party recovery to beneficiaries,
however, this formulation may be a bit too broad. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment c (1981).
183. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
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estoppel liability to third parties in 1974, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
declared:
We can see no reason to limit recovery to those persons who would
be considered third party beneficiaries under contract law if this is what
the proposed comment suggests. If the plaintiff can prove the essential
facts he should not be precluded from recovery as a third party reason18 4
ably relying on promises made to others.
3.

The Later Cases

The other two major 1970s cases discussing promissory estoppel liability
to third parties reached contrasting conclusions, but their differences are
largely attributable to their divergent facts.' 85 In Aronowicz v. Nalley's,
Inc.18 6 a food distributor, Nalley's, promised a newly formed firm, Major,
that it would distribute meat products prepared by Major. Major's incorporators, Duncan and Aronowicz, took innumerable actions in reliance on the
promise. For example, the incorporators quit their previous jobs, purchased
meat products, set up a factory, committed their own assets to the project,
and obtained investments from others.' 8 7 After Nalley's backed out of the
deal at the last minute, Duncan and Aronowicz sued Nalley's "under promissory estoppel theories."' 8 8 After quoting the proposed section 90 and its
comment to support the extension of liability to third parties,18 9 the court
found Nalley's liable.' 90
Like Aronowicz, CR. Fedrick, Inc. v. Sterling-Salem Corp.191 involved
184. Silberman v. Roethe, 64 Wis. 2d 131, 148, 218 N.W.2d 723, 731-32 (1974). In Silberman, though, the third-party plaintiff did not recover. Defendant Nasco, Inc. promised to
purchase a firm named Milway, Inc. and to strengthen it financially. Silberman, the thirdparty plaintiff, relied on this promise by reducing the amount of a debt owed him by Milway.
The court denied recovery, finding that questions about the detrimental nature of Silberman's
reliance, the informality of the promise, and the fact that all parties to the transaction were
businessmen failed to satisfy § 90's injustice element. See id. at 143-47, 218 N.W.2d at 729-31.
The court also concluded that the promise was the type of promise that the promisor should
reasonably have expected to induce definite and substantial action or forbearance. Id. at 154,
218 N.W.2d at 734.
185. See infra notes 186-197 and accompanying text; see also Oates v. Teamsters Affiliates
Pension Plan, 482 F. Supp. 481, 488 n.34 (D.D.C. 1979) (use of estoppel by third party not
precluded, but issue irrelevant).
186. 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1973).
187. Id. at 36-37, 45, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29, 435-36.
188. Id. at 33, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 427. Major sued under both contract and estoppel theories. While the court apparently found ample grounds for concluding that Major could recover in contract, it refused to characterize the lower court's verdict for Major as contractual.
See id. at 44, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
189. Id. at 44-45, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
190. [D]efendant knew that Aronowicz and Duncan were leaving their previous
employment, investing and pledging their fortunes and securing the investments
of others in substantial amounts ....Defendant watched these efforts by plaintiffs, encouraged them, approved of the results, and went so far as to commence
to secure orders for the products to be manufactured by Major ....It would be
a blemish on the face of justice to allow defendant to now disclaim any
responsibility.
Id. at 45, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 435-36.
191. 507 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1974).
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California law, but the cases have little else in common. In Aronowicz the
corporate promisee Major was virtually identical with its third-party incorporators Duncan and Aronowicz, and defendant Nalley's dealt with Duncan
192
and Aronowicz, who acted on behalf of their newly founded corporation.
In Fedrick, on the other hand, the defendant gave price quotations on sewage pump equipment to a supplier that it believed to be the ultimate purchaser. The supplier then submitted a higher price quotation on the same
equipment to Fedrick, a contractor, identifying the defendant as the source
of the equipment. Fedrick used this quotation to compute its bid to a California Improvement District for the construction of sewage pump stations.
The Improvement District accepted the bid, but the defendant never received Fedrick's purchase order for the equipment and never accepted it.
Nonetheless, Fedrick and the defendant continued to discuss the suitability
of defendant's equipment for Fedrick's project until they finally reached an
impasse. Fedrick then had to obtain the equipment at a higher price.
Fedrick claimed that section 90 estopped the defendant from denying a con93
tractual relationship between the two parties.'
The three-judge panel denied Fedrick's claim because: (1) the defendant
thought that it was dealing with the supplier "as its customer" and thus had
no "[r]easonable expectation that a particularthird party" would rely upon
its promise, and (2) the price the defendant quoted and the price the supplier
quoted to Fedrick were different.' 94 The precise scope of the court's holding, however, is unclear.95 A two-judge concurrence concluded that California courts would allow the third party to recover "only when a promisor
knows that a third party may reasonably rely on his offer, and only when the
third party so relies."' 96 Thus, the concurring judges would "require that
the promisor intend his offer to reach the third party without undergoing
change en route," and that it "be the offer of the promisor and not some
192. The letter in which Nalley's promised to become Major's distributor was delivered to
Duncan. Aronowicz, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 35, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 428. Lengthy discussions between Nalley's and the two third parties and a detailed proposal from Duncan to Nalley's
preceded this letter. Id. at 34, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
193. Fedrick, 507 F.2d at 321. Fedrick sought "damages... founded on the delay in and
additional cost of" completing the project. Id.
194. Id. at 322 (emphasis in original).
195. The court stated that the revised version of § 90 should have no application to "price
quotations by manufacturers to general contractors." Id. at 322. The facts supporting the
ruling stated in the text, however, obviously have a narrower sweep. The opinion also discussed the wider implications of a contrary decision. For example, the court worried that
manufacturers who issue price lists to dealers might be liable if the dealer transmits the quotation to a third party without the manufacturer's knowledge, and that this might occur even if
the dealer changes the terms of the quotation. Id. The court said further: "It would seem that
Section 90 (Revised) should, if at all, only be applicable to third persons in complete privity
with the terms of the promise made by the promisor and whose conduct of reliance is in
answer to the terms of the promise." Id. at 322 n.9 (emphasis in original). Since privity of
contract is a term usually employed with reference toparties,the meaning of "privity with the
terms of the promise" is unclear. Perhaps this portion of the opinion merely explains that
liability should not exist where the intermediary has changed the promisor's terms. For a
suggestion that the Fedrick decision is easily explained under § 90's tests, see infra note 265.
196. Fedrick, 507 F.2d at 323 (Merrill, J., concurring).
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intervening elaboration or modification on which the third party relies." 197
Third-party promissory estoppel claims since the Second Restatement's
issuance in 1981 have also produced mixed results. In Bolden v. General
Accident, Fire, & Life Assurance Corp.198 an Illinois intermediate appellate
court rejected the doctrine's extension to third parties. 199 In that case, the

plaintiffs, who had suffered injury in an automobile accident, sued to enforce
promises allegedly made in a settlement agreement between two insurers.

Their first complaint stated a third-party beneficiary theory, but their second
amended complaint "sound[ed] in promissory estoppel. ' '2°° In deciding
plaintiffs' appeal of the defendant's successful motion to dismiss, the court
considered only the promissory estoppel claim contained in the amended

complaint. 20 Since the complaint failed to allege that the defendant insurer
ever made a promise to the plaintiffs, they had to sue as third parties. After
noting that "no cases in Illinois . . . have allowed anyone other than the
promisee to proceed on a promissory estoppel theory, ' 20 2 the court considered whether it should adopt section 90's embrace of third parties. To this
end, the court discussed some of the cases extending liability to such parties,
20 3
"In
but finally declined the plaintiffs' invitation to join those decisions.
view of the substantial nature of the detriment apparent in [those] decisions," the court stated, "the instant case would not provide the best vehicle
for effectuating a change in Illinois law, even if desirable, for several reasons. '' 2° 4 These reasons were the court's uncertainty about the existence of
the alleged settlement agreement and its conclusion that the plaintiffs' reli197. Id.
198. 119 Ill. App. 3d 263, 456 N.E.2d 306 (1983); see also Marine Transp. Lines v. International Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, 636 F. Supp. 384, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (statement "to
a third party" apparently one reason for rejecting a promissory estoppel claim) (emphasis in
original)); Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 334, 337 S.E.2d 132 (1985).
In Lee the third-party plaintiff was a lender that had agreed to make advances to a construction subcontractor. The lender conditioned these advances on the general contractor's agreement to make its future payments to the subcontractor payable to the lender as well. The
general contractor therefore promised the subcontractor that it would make future checks
payable to both the subcontractor and the lender. The general contractor subsequently
breached this promise by making some of the checks payable to other parties. The court first
rejected the plaintiff lender's third-party beneficiary claim, since the subcontractor's return
promise was merely a promise to perform a preexisting contractual obligation and therefore
did not supply consideration for the general contractor's promise. Id. at 338, 337 S.E.2d at
135. The court further considered whether the third party's reliance could serve "[a]s a substitute for the want of consideration." Id. After discussing the new version of § 90 and its
history, the court declined to grant the third party's claim because it found no North Carolina
cases permitting § 90 recovery by a third party. See id. at 338-41, 337 S.E.2d at 136. Lee
provides an example of a third-party beneficiary case where the third party attempted to use its
own reliance as a substitute for the absence of consideration in the agreement between the
promisor and the promisee. See supra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
199. 119 Ill. App. 3d at 269, 456 N.E.2d at 311.
200. Id. at 265, 456 N.E.2d at 308. The court referred to the promissory estoppel claim as
''an action," ''a cause of action," and "a theory" and also called the third-party beneficiary
claim an "alternative theory." Id.
201. Id. at 265, 456 N.E.2d at 308.
202. Id. at 266, 456 N.E.2d at 309.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 267-68, 456 N.E.2d at 309.
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ance was insubstantial. 20 5
In Ravelo v. County of Hawaii,20 6 however, the Hawaii Supreme Court
adopted the new section 90 and its inclusion of third parties. 20 7 In that case,
the Hawaii County Police Department informed Ravelo by letter that the
county had accepted his application for employment as a police officer.
Ravelo and his wife relied on this promise by quitting their jobs and removing their children from a private school. The county then rescinded the offer
under state regulations declaring that probationary employees like Ravelo
could be terminated without cause at any time. The lower court therefore
dismissed the Ravelos' complaint. On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court
stated that it could not "fault the circuit court's perception that the averments in the complaint could not sustain an action premised on a breach of a
formal contract. '20 8 The court, however, considered whether the plaintiffs
could recover under "alternative theories of relief," and concluded that
promissory estoppel filled the bill. 2°9 After quoting and discussing the 1932
and 1981 versions of section 90, the court declared that "the revised section
provides a sounder legal foundation for the application of promissory estoppel, and we deem it advisable that the current § 90 be followed hereafter." 210
"Hence," the court concluded, "we expect that relief here, if appropriate,
211
will extend to Mrs. Ravelo as well as Mr. Ravelo.
C. Implicationsfor the Independent Theory Argument
As we stated earlier, this section has two general aims. The first is simply
to examine the promissory estoppel cases involving third-party claimants.
Here, although the decisions explicitly discussing the point are relatively few
and are concentrated in a few states, the weight of such authority clearly
supports estoppel's extension to third parties in appropriate cases. 21 2 This
section also considers how these decisions affect the argument that promissory estoppel is becoming an independent theory of recovery. As the preceding discussion suggests, some of these cases display the outward indicia of
independent theory status identified earlier in the Article. 21 3 Some of the
cases, that is, base the plaintiff's claim solely on estoppel without mentioning
contract law; 21 4 some segment the plaintiff's contract and estoppel
205. See id. at 268-69, 456 N.E.2d at 309-11.
206. 66 Haw. 194, 658 P.2d 883 (1983); see also Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386
N.W.2d 892, 896-97 (N.D. 1986) (rejecting third-party's promissory estoppel claim because
reliance neither substantial nor justifiable, but expressing no objection to third-party estoppel
claims in general).
207. 66 Haw. at 201, 658 P.2d at 887-88.
208. Id. at 198, 658 P.2d at 886.
209. Id. at 199, 658 P.2d at 886-87.
210. Id. at 201, 658 P.2d at 887-88.
211. Id., 658 P.2d at 888.
212. See supra notes 155-211 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (stating these indicia).
214. See, e.g., Ravelo, 66 Haw. at 198-201, 658 P.2d at 887-88; Bolden v. General Accident,
Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 119 Ill. App. 3d 263, 265-69, 456 N.E.2d 306, 308-11 (1983)
(contract claim in first complaint not considered).
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claims; 21 5 and some use terms like "theory" to describe the estoppel
claim. 21 6 These cases also support the independent theory argument in two
other ways. Each involves a comparison between the third-party promissory
estoppel cases and the third-party beneficiary discussion that opened this
217
section.
A genuinely "independent" theory of recovery should employ tests of liability different from its competitors. 218 Here, this means that the standards
for determining promissory estoppel liability to third parties should differ
from the tests used for determining liability under third-party beneficiary
theory. Obviously, section 90's elements differ from the intent standards traditionally employed in third-party beneficiary cases. 2 19 Moreover, although
the evidence is mixed, comment c to section 90 arguably does not require
that the relying third party also qualify as an intended beneficiary. 220 Nor
does comment c reiterate the new reliance-oriented third party beneficiary
tests set by comment d to Restatement (Second) section 302.221 Section 90
requires actual reliance on the third party's part, while comment d does not,
if read literally. 22 2 Even though some of the cases applying comment d men-

tion actual reliance, they generally make it one factor to be weighed along
with traditional intent standards. 223 Under section 90, on the other hand,
actual reliance constitutes a distinct element in the plaintiff's case. 224 All of

these factors show the difference between third-party beneficiary theory and
promissory estoppel theory.
The most important difference between third-party beneficiary recovery
and promissory estoppel recovery, however, is that the former requires a
contract between promisor and promisee while the latter does not. 225 Third
parties mounting a promissory estoppel claim therefore need only establish
the elements of estoppel in order to recover. In Hoffman, for example, the
court's opinion demonstrated that no contract existed between Red Owl and
Hoffman, but this absence did not prevent Hoffman's wife from recovering. 2 26 Also, the absence of third-party beneficiary claims in some of the
215. E.g., Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892, 895-97 (N.D. 1986); cf.
Aronowicz v. Nalley's Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427 (1973) (one plaintiff sues under contract and estoppel; two others sue under estoppel only); Bolden v. General
Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 119 Ill. App. 3d 263, 265, 456 N.E.2d 306, 307-08 (1983)
(first complaint sounded in contract, second in estoppel).
216. See e.g., supra notes 188, 202 and accompanying text. The Hawaii Supreme Court's
language in Ravelo is especially revealing in this respect. See supra text accompanying notes
208-209.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 106-146.
218. See supra text following note 53.
219. Compare supra text accompanying note 29 (classic test for § 90) with supra text accompanying notes 108-112 (classic tests for third-party beneficiary).
220. See supra notes 165-184 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 169-178.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 86-94; notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 139-146 and accompanying text.
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) ("and which does induce
such action or forbearance").
225. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 70, 73, 155-56 and accompanying text. Also, in C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v.
Sterling-Salem Corp., 507 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1974), the court permitted a promissory estoppel
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other estoppel decisions strongly suggests that no contract was present in
those cases either. 227 Indeed, the authors do not read any of the third-party
estoppel cases discussed above as specifically requiring the plaintiff to prove
a contract between the promisor and the promisee. 228 These cases arguably
can be conceptualized as third-party beneficiary decisions because they use
the third party's foreseeable reliance to substitute for missing contract elements, thus creating a contract between promisor and promisee. 229 With
one possible exception, however, the opinions do not explicitly say anything
of the sort. 230 Also, it is difficult to see how a common-law doctrine like
estoppel could ever "cure" the statutorily and administratively created ter231
mination power that blocked a normal contract recovery in Ravelo.
Even conceding promissory estoppel's independent theory status, one
might still dismiss the development as a technicality. That is, readers inclined to agree with the two preceding paragraphs might respond with a
weary "so what?" In reality, though, promissory estoppel's use as an independent theory of recovery increases the likelihood that promisors will be
liable to third parties. 232 For example, courts following a literal reading of
comment d to Restatement (Second) section 302 use the promise's ability to
provoke reasonable reliance as an index of the parties' intention to confer a
right on the third person. 233 Nonetheless, in Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board v. Rapistan,234 where the court denied liability under such an apclaim to proceed even though apparently no contract nor agency relationship existed between
the defendant promisor and the promisee-supplier. See 507 F.2d at 321 (supplier never advised
promisor that it had accepted promisor's price quotation, and trial court's finding of agency
relation not supported by the evidence); see also supra text accompanying notes 193-197 (discussion of Fedrick).
227. E.g., C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Sterling-Salem Corp., 507 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1974); Ravelo
v. County of Hawaii, 66 Haw. 194, 658 P.2d 883 (1983); Silberman v. Roethe, 64 Wis. 2d 131,
218 N.W.2d 723 (1974).
228. The court in Bolden v. General Accident, Fire, & Life Assurance Corp., 119 Ill. App.
3d 263, 268, 456 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1985), did, however, make the absence of an agreement
between promisor and promisee one factor in its decision not to adopt the new version of § 90.
Even here, though, the court's statement of the elements of a successful estoppel case did not
include a contract between promisor and promisee. Id. at 266, 456 N.E.2d at 308. Furthermore, in Ravelo v. County ofHawaii the court discussed the estoppel claim mounted by Ravelo
and his wife without mentioning the terminable-at-will employment contract between Ravelo
and the county. See Ravelo, 66 Haw. at 199-201, 658 P.2d at 887-88.
229. See supra notes 173-178 and accompanying text (suggesting this interpretation of
comment c to § 90).
230. In Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 334, 338-41, 337 S.E.2d
132, 135-36 (1985), the court did consider an argument that the third party's reliance should
substitute for the consideration missing from the agreement between promisor and promisee.
The court, however, rejected that argument and with it the third-party beneficiary claim. See
supra note 198.
231. See Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 66 Haw. 194, 197-98 & n.2, 658 P.2d 883, 886 & n.2
(1983).
232. As we have noted, however, one technical difference between estoppel and third-party
beneficiary theory--comment d's failure to include actual reliance-seems to make life easier
for the plaintiff under third-party beneficiary law. In the cases of concern to us, though, the
third party will have relied. Moreover, a promise capable of provoking reasonable reliance
under comment d to § 302 should often generate reliance in fact.
233. See supra notes 130, 131 and accompanying text.
234. 472 Pa. 36, 371 A.2d 178 (1976).
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proach, the third party could possibly have recovered under promissory estoppel. 235 More importantly, some of the promissory estoppel cases
discussed earlier allowed the third-party plaintiff to recover even where
traditional third-party beneficiary law probably would not have permitted
such recoveries. 236 As just demonstrated, third parties can and have recovered under promissory estoppel in the absence of a contract between promisor and promisee. 237 If third-party beneficiary liability was possible in these
cases, why did the plaintiffs eschew this obvious avenue of relief and pursue
an unconventional claim such as promissory estoppel?
D.

The Relation Between Promissory Estoppel and Third-Party
Beneficiary Theory

The preceding discussion has left us with two general bases for promissory
liability to third parties: a normal contractual third-party beneficiary claim,
supplemented by the reliance criteria of comment d to section 302; and
promissory estoppel. Where estoppel has attained independent theory status, the plaintiff should presumably be able to pursue both claims simultaneously. A few courts have followed this approach.2 38 Thus, the third-party
plaintiff should be able to recover under both theories where the plaintiff (1)
qualifies as a donee or creditor beneficiary under traditional rules or as an
intended beneficiary under the Restatement (Second); and (2) meets the various tests for promissory estoppel liability.2 39 Where the plaintiff is merely
an incidental beneficiary, but satisfies the promissory estoppel requirements,
235. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text (discussing Rapistan). There, Rapistan obviously promised the PLCB that it would construct a conveyor system meeting certain
specifications, and Holt allegedly relied to its detriment on those specifications when computing its bid to the PLCB. See Rapistan, 472 Pa. at 40-41, 371 A.2d at 180. At first blush, a
potential warehouse operator might foreseeably rely in this way. The plaintiff alleged that
Rapistan actually was aware that a third party would operate its equipment, and that Rapistan
might have reasonably foreseen that this party would be a relying bidder. Id. at 46, 371 A.2d
at 183.
The court concluded that it was not reasonable for Holt to rely on Rapistan's promise. Id.
at 46, 371 A.2d at 183. The court's reasonableness analysis was, however, merely a surrogate
for a conventional "intent of the parties" inquiry. Under the court's literal reading of comment d there was little to indicate the parties' specific intention to benefit a third party. See
supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. No obvious reason supports such a test under
promissory estoppel. Moreover, under § 90 a court considers reasonableness of reliance
merely a factor for determining whether it is unjust not to enforce the promise, and not a
specific element of recovery. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The court's reasonableness analysis, in sum, seems closely tied to the third-party beneficiary context in which the
case proceeded.
236. See supra notes 155-211 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
238. See e.g., Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892 (N.D. 1986) (denying
each claim); cf Aronowicz v. Nalley's, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 41-42, 106 Cal. Rptr. 424,
432-33 (1973) (considering claim that contract recovery precludes estoppel recovery by promisee, but apparently rejecting this argument on facts of case).
239. Some authority, however, supports the proposition that the plaintiff should not be able
to employ estoppel where a normal contract recovery is possible. See supra note 48. The
courts have apparently begun to abandon this rule, which seems inconsistent with true independent theory status for promissory estoppel. Even where this rule does apply, it would
not prevent the plaintiff from recovering, but would only affect the legal standards governing
his damages. Due to the extremely open-ended character of estoppel remedy standards, see
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only the latter basis supports recovery. 240 Intended beneficiaries who have
not foreseeably relied should receive only a contract recovery. 24 1 Third parties who satisfy neither the tests for third-party beneficiary recovery nor the
requirements for liability under promissory estoppel should not obtain relief
under either theory.
Under the traditional intent-oriented standards for third-party beneficiary
recovery, the scheme just suggested would have a modicum of conceptual
neatness. Courts would decide third-party beneficiary claims under the established tests, and promissory estoppel claims would proceed under section
90 or some variant of it.24 2 By injecting reliance tests into the third-party
beneficiary picture, however, comment d to section 302 muddies the water
considerably. 243 The courts will sometimes have to consider reliance in two
separate contexts, and will have to employ it differently in each context. In
promissory estoppel cases, courts will usually apply the standard section 90
requirements. 244 In third-party beneficiary cases, comment d and the cases
applying it suggest two possible approaches: (1) reading the comment literally by ignoring actual reliance and using the reasonableness of third-party
reliance as a gauge of the parties' intent to benefit that party; and (2) making
reasonable and actual reliance factors along with established intent standards. 24 5 Since neither approach is consistent with section 90, in some cases
the courts may be left to consider three different ways of using reliance in
third-party suits. The likely result is a certain amount of judicial confusion.
While this confusion may not affect the disposition of too many cases, it still
is advisable for courts to ignore comment d and purge third-party beneficiary law of reliance elements. 24 6 By basing third-party beneficiary recovery
solely on traditional intent-related tests and leaving reliance to section 90,
this move would achieve a degree of conceptual clarity.
III.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THIRD PARTIES-AN EVALUATION

By imposing liability under tests and in situations that differ from thirdparty beneficiary theory, the cases allowing promissory estoppel recovery by
third parties support the claim that the doctrine is emerging as an independent cause of action. The cases recognizing third-party recovery, however,
are not yet so numerous as to etch the trend in stone. For this reason, this
section considers the desirability of allowing third parties to recover when
supra note 94, and the possibility of reliance-based damages in contract cases, see supra note
52, it is unclear how much practical impact such a rule would have in any event.
240. The Rapistan case provides a possible example. See supra notes 132-136, 234-235 and
accompanying text.
241. Examples would include almost all traditional donee-beneficiary and creditor-beneficiary situations where the third party did not rely.
242. Compare supra text accompanying notes 107-117 (third-party beneficiary tests) with
supra text accompanying note 87 (promissory estoppel test).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 120-128.
244. See supra text accompanying note 87.
245. See supra notes 125-146 and accompanying text.
246. See Prince, supra note 108, at 989, 990 (seemingly arguing that third-party reliance be
considered under § 90 and nowhere else).
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they foreseeably rely on promises made to another person. In examining this
question, the discussion turns first to the justifications for extending promissory estoppel to third parties. The section then considers the problems this
extension may eventually create and suggests possible ways to minimize
these problems.
A. The Case for Protecting Third-PartyReliance
Any argument for allowing recovery by third parties who rely on promises
made to others must rest on the assumption that it is desirable to protect
reliance in general. As the reader may have gathered by inference, the authors accept this assumption. Of course, one can dismiss as an arbitrary
personal preference the belief that people who foreseeably rely on promises
are morally entitled to recompense. 247 Nevertheless, the reliance interest derives support from the way it has found favor over time. As noted earlier,
reliance apparently was a significant factor in the action of assumpsit that
preceded modern contract law. 24 8 The previous discussion amply demonstrates that protection of reliance has been a major theme within the twentieth century law of contract. 249 Thus, the reliance interest seems to reflect a
fairly permanent moral intuition that supports recovery by relying third parties. 250 Yet it is also an intuition whose influence has waxed and waned
depending on the social milieu in which it operates.
The main reason for the nineteenth century de-emphasis of the reliance
interest was the economic individualism that pervaded that century's contract law. 25 1 One aspect of this laissez-faire orientation was the desire to
limit contractual liability. 25 2 Two concrete expressions of this desire were
the general tendency to deny recovery where unbargained-for reliance had
occurred, 253 and the rule that no contract liability would obtain where the
254
parties had not fully and clearly spelled out the terms of their agreement.
247. E.g., Feinman, supra note 8, at 711 (basic tenet of liberal theory that, because values
are arbitrary and subjective, no objective measure for assessing relative importance of different
values exists).
248. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 19-28.
250. But see Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract,
89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1263-64 n. 15 (1980). The authors argue that "if moral force is attached to
promises merely because people rely on them, the argument is subject to the claim that such
reliance is dependent upon legal enforceability." Id. But while reliance on legally enforceable
promises may carry greater moral weight than reliance on unenforceable promises, centuries of
evidence indicate that many people will rely to their significant detriment on legally unenforceable promises, for example oral promises within the statute of frauds. We may choose not to
protect such reliance for other reasons-for example, because the social cost of doing so exceeds the obtainable benefits, or because we judge countervailing moral claims to be superior.
But any implication that a decision not to protect an interest necessarily entails a judgment
that it is devoid of any moral claim goes too far.
251. This statement places more weight on widely shared nineteenth century values than
on material factors like the structure of the economy. The authors suspect that situations
where promises induced foreseeable reliance were fairly common even in the relatively decen-

tralized nineteenth century economy.
252. See G.

GILMORE,

supra note 10, at 14-17; supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.

253. See G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 18-21; supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g, J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 126-27, 129 (2d
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Another aspect of the prevalent laissez-faire ethos was a "[n]o man is his
brother's keeper" spirit 255 that tended not to sympathize with relying promisees. 256 As a result, nineteenth century courts would almost certainly have
denied recovery in a case like Hoffman. 2 57 An archetypal court might have
declared not only that Hoffman was imprudent in relying on an incomplete
offer, but that courts should protect promisors like Red Owl from liability on
indefinite obligations that they did not clearly assume.
Certain general features of modem society, on the other hand, help explain the revival of the reliance interest in the twentieth century. These features also indirectly support the claim that this revival is a desirable
development. In making the latter statement, the authors do not assert the
innate goodness of whatever changing times may bring, or even the futility
of resisting such changes. 258 Instead, the analysis merely makes three interconnected points. First, among the many reciprocal relations between law
and society, factors such as the structure of economic relations and widely
shared social values inevitably influence the legal order. Secondly, disharmony between the legal and the social spheres has practical costs that sometimes justify letting the former follow the latter. Finally, certain perennial
moral claims like the reliance interest seem especially worthy of support
when social conditions let them flower.
The increased interdependence characterizing modem society is the usual
explanation for the greater protection given reliance in the twentieth century. 259 This "interdependence" can be regarded in two overlapping, yet
conceptually distinguishable ways. First, it can be seen as a materialcondition giving basically egoistic individuals and groups a practical need to rely
on each other, and giving courts a practical incentive to protect such reliance. 26° For example, a complex, specialized economy of the modem sort
ed. 1907) (offer must state all needed terms and do so in clear fashion); Henderson, supra note
21, at 357-58 (traditional offer and acceptance rules give parties freedom to express, or refuse
to express, a willingness to be bound and also seek to insure that obligation attaches only when
it has been deliberately undertaken). Today, by contrast, indefinite agreements are much more
likely to be enforced. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204(1), (3) (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 33 & comments a, b (1981); id. § 34.
255. G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 95.
256. "No matter how much detriment a promisee may have suffered, he has not, thereby,
necessarily furnished a consideration. Nor does he have, so far as Holmes takes us, any right
to redress or even any claim on our sympathies." Id. at 20.
257. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
258. As a likely example of the second view, consider Holmes's well-known statement that
"[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong." 0. HOLMES, supra note 11,
at 36 (emphasis added).
259. E.g., Fuller, supra note 97, at 823 ("with an increasing interdependence among the
members of society we may expect to see reliance ...become increasingly important as a basis
of liability"). See generally Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging
under the Guise of PromissoryEstoppel: An Explanationand Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895,
908-11 (1987) (sketching these and related explanations without deciding whether they are
accurate). For a fuller statement of our views about the social origins of promissory estoppel's
rise, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 500-08.
260. "We are now all cogs in a machine, each dependent on the other." G. GILMORE,
supra note 10, at 95.
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may require a high degree of trust for its proper functioning, and thus may
26 1
require that economic actors be able to rely on each others' promises.
Here, courts protect reliance not because of any feeling of communal solidarity, but because enlightened self-interest demands it.
Interdependence can also be viewed in a second sense: as a widely-shared
moral feeling of interconnectedness superseding the nineteenth century's
economic individualism. In such a climate, parties whose promises cause
foreseeable detrimental reliance are in some sense "their brother's keeper,"
and thus are legally responsible for that reliance. 262 It is difficult to determine which of these two overlapping senses of the term interdependence best
explains the revival of the reliance interest in the twentieth century, or the
relative weight to be assigned to each sense. Also difficult to determine is
what might have produced the changed moral outlook constituting our second sense of the term, or the extent to which that outlook has actually
changed. One possible explanation is the way the rise of the large corporation has undermined classical contract law and its economic individualism
by creating marked disparities in bargaining position. 263 With the field thus
cleared, longstanding ethical claims like the reliance principle could once
again make themselves felt.
For all these reasons, promise-induced reliance deserves legal protection.
Furthermore, no obvious reason exists to limit this protection to direct recipients of the promise. As the cases dealing with third-party reliance demonstrate, such reliance is occasionally every bit as real, foreseeable, and
reasonable as reliance by promisees. 264 If the goal is to protect reliance, why
deny such parties recovery? Admittedly, a random sample of potential
third-party suits is likely to contain proportionately more unjustifiable
claims than a similar sample of suits by promisees. Section 90's tests of recovery should, however, usually eliminate such claims. 265 As a group, third261. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 48, at 927-29.
262. Cf id. at 942 (reliance protected to foster a society in which value of trust gets greater
recognition and in which people can confidently rely on each other); Kostritsky, supra note
259, at 942-43 (discussing altruistic explanation for promissory estoppel cases).
263. For one rendition of this very familiar story, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at

501-04.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 154-211.
265. For example, in C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Sterling-Salem Corp., 507 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.
1974), the defendant made a bid to a middleman who later revised the bid and submitted it to
the plaintiff. See supra notes 191-197 and accompanying text. The main opinion in the case
apparently limited § 90's third-party application "to third persons in complete privity with the
terms of the promise made by the promisor and whose conduct of reliance is in answer to the
terms of the promise." Id. at 322 n.9 (emphasis in original). The court explained the reason for
this limitation as follows:
An application of [plaintiff's] proposed interpretation of Section 90 (Revised)
would import that no manufacturer could issue a price list to an independent
dealer without the fear that some day (unbeknownst to him) the manufacturer

might be called upon to answer to a third party for an independent dealer's price
quotation to that third party, even though the price list may bear the legend in
boldest possible type that "prices are subject to change without notice." So, too,
manufacturers may be called upon, in a litigative posture, to answer for contractual terms that may differ vastly from those originally consummated between

the manufacturer and the independent dealer.
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party promissory estoppel claims should fare less well under section 90's
tests of foreseeable, reasonable, promise-induced reliance than claims by
promisees. 266 In the process, section 90's tests should do a tolerable job of
distinguishing cases implicating the reliance interest from cases where the
relevant policies do not justify recovery.
B.

The Spectre of Mass Liability

In general, then, the extension of promissory estoppel liability to third
parties is a desirable development. 267 But the reliance principle on which
this expansion is based, while important, is hardly absolute. Indeed, section
90 recognizes as much by limiting the circumstances in which reliance-based
recoveries may occur. 268 In one general class of third-party cases, however,
section 90's tests may not restrict liability in a satisfactory manner. Here,
maximum protection of the reliance interest through a broad reading of section 90's elements may have unfortunate consequences. The cases in question involve situations where the promise creates potential section 90 liability
to a large number of third-party plaintiffs. Such situations pose, for example, problems of heavy dollar liability, the likely need to insure or self-insure
against such liability, the cost and availability of insurance, and the feasibility and desirability of passing on these various expenses to customers. These
problems, of course, have plagued tort law and product liability law for some
time.
To the authors' knowledge, promissory estoppel cases presenting the problem of mass third-party liability have not yet arisen. 2 69 Yet the doctrine's
long history of expansion into new areas makes the problem's emergence
quite possible. Obviously, mass liability cases may arise in an unpredictably
Id. at 322.
On the facts of the case, however, § 90's tests very adequately prevent liability and therefore
render such a limitation unnecessary. Courts will probably not regard a promise whose terms
are altered by a middleman as one "which the [promisor] should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance" by a third person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1)
(1981). Where the terms have been changed, moreover, how can the promisor's promise to the
dealer be a promise "which does induce such action or forbearance"? Id. In such cases, the
promise actually provoking reliance is distinct from the promisor's original promise.
266. Such claims should also fare less well under the predictive variables discussed in Kostritsky, supra note 259, at 911-29. Two of Kostritsky's variables affecting promissory estoppel
recovery, (1) the parties' enmeshment in broad long-term ties, and (2) the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties, are especially unlikely in the third-party
context. Id.
267. Third-party recoveries for reliance induced by the defendant's statements occur in
other areas of the law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977) (extending seller's liability for express
and implied warranties outside privity of contract where, among other things, it was reasonable to expect that the plaintiff would use, consume, or be affected by the goods); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (extending liability for negligent misstatements by
professionals and others to certain relying third parties).
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 78-99.
269. As the rules regarding claims on government contracts indicate, however, the problem
has long been evident in the third-party beneficiary context. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 110, at 726-27 (discussing third-party suits against water companies, highway contractors, and utilities in which presence or absence of consequential damages was a factor in deny-

ing or allowing recovery).
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broad set of situations. Existing third-party beneficiary and promissory estoppel cases, however, provide a few representative possibilities. Suppose,
for example, that the promisor is a construction firm promising to complete
a large office building for the promisee by a certain date, and that prospective tenants suffer reliance losses when the building is not finished on
time. 270 Or consider third-party beneficiaries in government contract situations such as promises to supply water to city fire hydrants2 71 or to provide
electricity to customers within a city.272 Third parties harmed by breach of
such promises normally will have relied in the sense that they counted on the
uninterrupted provision of such services in conducting their activities and
might have chosen to locate elsewhere had they had reason to expect the
breach. While these are not the sort of discrete, tangible, promise-induced
changes in position found in Hoffman and similar cases, judges may on occasion sympathize with the plaintiffs. 273 Indeed, some courts have already be274
come very lenient when applying section 90's actual reliance requirement.
Finally, if a troubled corporation promises the employees of an unprofitable
plant in a one-industry town that the plant will continue to operate, local
residents as well as the employees may suffer reliance losses when the corporation breaches the promise. 275 In each of these situations, one can easily
flesh out the facts to create a mass of plausible third-party promissory estoppel claims. While other theories of recovery may be assertible in these cases,
the authors here assume that promissory estoppel provides a truly independent theory of recovery.
In some of the situations just sketched, the extension of promissory estoppel to third parties may exact severe consequences. For this reason, some
might urge that courts abort the extension before real damage occurs.276
Although the authors do not intend an exhaustive examination of this diffi270. Cf. McDonald Constr. Co. v. Murray, 5 Wash. App. 68, 485 P.2d 626 (1971) (no

recovery in third-party beneficiary suit by tenants). For additional discussion of McDonald,
see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, at 710.

271. Cf. Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs, 294 Ala. 606, 320 So. 2d 624, 628
(1975) (successful third-party beneficiary suit by owner of motel and restaurant destroyed by
fire); supra note 131 (discussing Harris).
272. Cf Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 98 A.D.2d 424, 469 N.Y.S.2d 948, 951 (1983), afl'd,
65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 38, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (1985) (unsuccessful negligence and

third-party beneficiary suits by apartment dweller injured in fall after electrical blackout).
273. See, e.g., Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs, 294 Ala. 606, 320 So. 2d 624
(1975) (plaintiff's motel and restaurant destroyed in fire).
274. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 48, at 910-14; see also supra notes 89-94 and
accompanying text (discussing the new § 90's deletion of the "definite and substantial" requirement). Although they differed in the use they made of this conclusion, both courts in the
cases cited in supra notes 271 and 272 assumed that the plaintiff had relied in some way. See
Harris,294 Ala. at 611, 320 So. 2d at 628 (fact that plaintiff relied on hydrant service one
reason for recovery); Strauss, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (even though plaintiff relied on flow of
electricity, reliance failed to give him rights greater than those possessed by general public).
275. Cf Local 1330, United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp.
1, 9 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (denying contract and estoppel claims based on employer's conditional

promise to keep plant open if workers made its operations profitable), affid in part and vacated
in part, 631 F.2d 1264-80 (6th Cir. 1980). For an entirely different rationale for enforcing such
promises, see Farber & Matheson, supra note 48, at 938-42.
276. Cf Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 402-05, 482 N.E.2d 34, 36, 492

N.Y.S.2d 555, 557-59 (1985) (court's refusal to extend negligence liability for electrical black-
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cult subject, several considerations weigh against so extreme an approach.
The first and most obvious is that otherwise deserving third parties may remain uncompensated, even if their losses are severe. 2 7 Also, promisors may
make some of the promises capable of provoking mass third-party liability
carelessly or without true commitment. In situations like this, the promisor's relatively culpable behavior argues for the imposition of liability. Finally, in these and other situations, a few well-publicized mass recoveries
may deter promisors from making false promises, cause them to refrain from
making promises they may not be able to keep, and stimulate them to keep
278
the promises they do make.
Thus, the authors believe, although with some trepidation, that the overall
benefits of extending promissory estoppel liability to third parties may exceed the costs to promisors and to society in mass liability cases. This quite
tentative conclusion, however, relies on a significant condition. Courts must
be able to limit mass liability through methods that do reasonable justice to
the competing interests of promisors, third parties, and society generally.
The various requirements articulated by section 90 of the Second Restatement arguably provide suitable points of departure for such an effort. What
follows is a brief assessment of some of the more obvious possibilities in
approximate order of ascending desirability. These brief suggestions are intended to be speculative and exploratory.
1. Reasonable Foreseeabilityof Reliance
Section 90's requirement that the promise be one "which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance" is basically a test
of reasonable foreseeability. 279 Greater stringency in the application of this
requirement would no doubt reduce the mass liability burden somewhat, but
one wonders how much. Many kinds of reliance likely to be induced by our
out beyond utility's actual customers based largely on fear of enormous liability to utility and

resulting social consequences).
277. Insurance may of course cover some of the losses. E.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
110, at 727 (noting availability of fire insurance as factor in denying third-party beneficiary
claim by warehouse owner against water company for failure to maintain adequate water pressure). However, because promisors in such cases also can insure and because they are likely to
have a greater ability to pass on costs than most promisees, allowing third-party recovery for
reliance losses is arguably consistent with the loss-spreading principle inherent in many modem contract rules. On this tendency in modem contract law, see Farber, Contract Law and
Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 303, 335-36 (1983) (contract law seems to embody an insurance principle limiting individual catastrophic losses).
278. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 250, at 1266 (observing that enforcement of promises
shapes nature and amount of promise-making activity). If courts enforce promises of a partic-

ular sort, promisors will be far more cautious about making them and far more forthcoming
about the circumstances under which they will be unwilling to perform as promised. Id. at
1279. Accordingly, promisees and third parties will receive more accurate information to
guide them in deciding whether or not to rely on a promise. Id. Thus, one general reason for
enforcing promises is that parties will adapt their behavior in ways that positively affect social
welfare. Id. at 1263-64. However, this could also mean that promisors will be deterred from
making some socially useful promises. Id. at 1265. In the authors' judgment, however, this

particular cost is unlikely to be substantial for the types of promises considered here.
279. Boyer, supra note 6, at 461-64.
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set of illustrative promises are all too foreseeable. 280 The courts, however,
could quite effectively reduce the promisor's exposure by requiring that the
defendant have foreseen that the specific plaintiff would rely on the promise. 28 ' In this way, they could deny recovery to third parties whom the
promisor could not identify at the time of the promise, even though the
promisor could have foreseen that many people of this general sort would
rely in certain specifiable ways. From the plaintiff's vantage point, however,
this requirement is a rather artificial and arbitrary criterion for distinguishing winners from losers.
2.

Reasonableness of Reliance

A court should consider the "reasonableness of the promisee's reliance" as
28 2
a factor when applying section 90's "avoiding of injustice" requirement.
The reasonableness of the third party's reliance should operate similarly in
suits by third parties. In most cases, consideration of this factor will closely
resemble consideration of the forseeibility test just discussed. Since an objective test of reasonableness operates in both instances, the party's viewpoint
should not significantly affect the determination. In a few mass liability situations, however, the reasonableness requirement may have some independent significance. Where the promisor's situation, reputation, or past
behavior makes reliance on the promise unreasonable, 2 3 some third parties
may nonetheless rely, and this reliance may be foreseeable. Thus, when a
third party foreseeably, but unwisely, relies on a questionable promise, the
unreasonableness of the third party's action or forbearance may provide an
284
appropriate basis for a court to deny recovery.
3.

Disclaimers
Promisors who desire to avoid widespread promissory estoppel liability to
280. See supra notes 270-276 and accompanying text.
281. Cf. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 404-05, 482 N.E.2d 34, 37-38, 492

N.Y.S.2d 555, 558-59 (making a similar argument in a negligence suit). Cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 552(1), (2)(a) (1977); PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 747 (1984) (liability to third parties for negligent provision of business information generally limited to situations where promisor knows that recipient intends to supply information to particular third
parties or to class of such parties). In addition, many of the cases in which third parties have
recovered under promissory estoppel have involved plaintiffs whose identities were either
known or highly knowable to the promisor. See, e.g., supra notes 155-156, 186-192, 206-211
and accompanying text.
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment b (1981).
283. For example, suppose that everyone knows that a corporation promising to keep a
plant open is in perilous financial condition and the plant in question is a serious drag on its
profitability, and that everyone has considerable reason to suspect that the corporation made
the promise to influence potential lenders. Or suppose that a construction firm's past performance and general reputation and a brief examination of the construction site belie that firm's
promise to finish an office building by a certain date. Also, is it reasonable to rely on a promise
that electrical power will be supplied on a continuous basis? Surely, everyone is aware that
power failures can and do occur. Should not a reasonable person be expected to take reasonable steps to avoid losses caused by such failures?
284. Another option for the court would be to consider unreasonableness as a basis for
reducing the amount of the third party's recovery. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.

1988]

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

third parties may attempt to disclaim liability in advance. 285 A promisor
might simply include a statement that the promise is not enforceable by
third parties and that the promisor will not be liable for third-party reliance. 28 6 When such a promise nonetheless causes a third party to rely, the
promisor has at least two arguments for escaping liability. The first is that
since section 90 recovery is promissory recovery and the promise explicitly
denies third-party recovery, the promisor can never be liable to such a

party. 28 7 This argument raises a basic question about the aims and further
evolution of section 90. Is promissory estoppel primarily a device for enforcing promises, or is it mainly a vehicle for protecting reliance?28 8 To the extent that the latter concern outweighs the former, this promise-based
argument for using disclaimers to avoid liability loses force. Also, the argument has already been weakened by the many cases that have awarded the
28 9
plaintiff losses-in-reliance instead of promise-based expectations.
The promisor might next argue that no reasonable third party would rely
on a promise containing a disclaimer of the sort described. 290 As a general
proposition, this contention has much force. It assumes, however, that the
disclaimer is communicated to the third party in such a fashion that a reasonable person can recognize and understand it.291 Even when this occurs,
though, a court may still find grounds for imposing liability if the promisor
is in a position to dictate terms and the third party has little choice but to
rely. 292 Assuming adequate communication, for example, a third-party
285. This tactic, however, presents some practical problems. If used for business reasons
by, for example, builders or financially troubled corporations, a disclaimer may undermine the
credibility of the promise and thus defeat the promisor's practical aims in making the promise.
286. Various other ways of stating the promise can also affect the likelihood of promissory
estoppel recovery. Examples include reservation of a right to revoke, reservation of a right to
change terms, and use of a conditional promise. See C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Sterling-Salem
Corp., 507 F.2d 319, 322 (9th Cir. 1977) (reservation of right to change terms); supra note 71
(conditional promise). In addition, courts sometimes consider the definiteness of the promise
in determining promissory estoppel liability, but aggressive use of promissory estoppel usually
minimizes this factor. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. Definiteness, however,
still has some bearing on the reasonableness of the promisee's or third party's reliance.
287. Cf Metzger & Phillips, supra note A, at 532-38 (discussing illusory promises).
288. On the latter view, the promise's existence and attributes assume less importance.
[T]he promise must be viewed relationally: its ability to provoke reliance in a
particular context is the focus of concern. Instead of asking "is this behavior a
true promise meeting certain contractual tests?" courts might come to inquire
"is this promise or other behavior, however characterizable in the abstract, such
as to promote foreseeable reliance in the context where it occurred?"
Metzger & Phillips, supra note 4, at 539 (emphasis in original). At this point, promissory
estoppel might effectively become one part of an expanded law of negligence, with the breach
of duty consisting of the defendant's failure to avoid actions that would provoke reasonably
foreseeable reliance. Cf G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 89-90 (suggesting that promissory
estoppel may be becoming a "contort").
289. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965); Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 699-702, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275-77 (1965).
290. In most cases, the same basic argument might also be couched in terms of unforeseeability of reliance.
291. Thus, for example, courts in third-party promissory estoppel cases eventually may
have to consider questions of conspicuousness akin to those now considered in product liability
cases. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(10), 2-316(2) (1977).
292. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 281, at 482-83 (express assumption of risk clause
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apartment dweller may have little choice but to accept an electrical utility's
disclaimer of estoppel liability, while prospective tenants in an office building
or residents of a one-industry town may have other options.
4. Causation
Section 90 also requires that the promisor's promise be one "which does
induce ... action or forbearance. ' 293 This requirement is basically one of
causation, but to the authors' knowledge no authoritative statement detailing the degree of required inducement has ever appeared. Whether a mere
"but for" relation between promise and reliance will always suffice, or
whether the promise must sometimes play a larger role in causing the claimant to rely, is therefore unclear. Given this uncertainty, courts may manipulate this requirement to limit the promisor's exposure if confronted with
mass liability situations. Possibilities include a requirement that the promise
be a substantial factor in producing reliance, or even a rule that recovery be
denied if the promise's causal role falls below some arbitrary percentage.
This approach has the benefit of denying recovery when factors other than
294
the promise helped bring about the third party's action or forbearance.
For example, consider a bankrupt local store owner in a formerly one-industry town who argues that he remained in the town and suffered reliance
losses because the XYZ Corporation promised local employees that it would
keep the plant open and later breached that promise. The store owner might
remain a sympathetic figure if family ties were the main reason for his failure
to move, but the overriding need to keep liability within manageable bounds
might still dictate that he not recover. The causation determinations in this
and other cases obviously would be anything but tidy, and a court should
probably leave them to the factfinder.
5. Factor-BasedBalancing
Section 90 allows recovery only "if injustice can be avoided.., by enforcement of the promise. ' 295 An open-ended test of this sort obviously allows
courts to consider a wide range of factors, and one of section 90's comments
provides a list.296 Courts, however, need not limit themselves to the listed
factors when others seem relevant. Thus section 90's broad "injustice" requirement permits a factor-based approach that identifies, weighs, and balances the various relevant policy considerations. Mass liability and its
collateral effects are legitimate inquiries within such an approach.
In the present context, the obvious advantage of this approach is that it
permits courts explicitly to consider all the competing values at stake, and
make the inevitable tradeoffs in as sensitive and discriminating a fashion as
no defense in negligence case where party accepting risk suffers obvious disadvantage in bargaining power).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
294. It could also provide a basis for reducing the amount of the third party's recovery.
See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
295.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).

296. Id. comment b; see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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possible. Its equally obvious disadvantages include the mushy, uncertain,
discretionary decisionmaking factor-based balancing will produce and the
demands such an analysis will impose on the judiciary. 297 Decisionmaking
processes of the former sort, however, are not unknown to twentieth century
American law. 298 Furthermore, while the courts' less-than-sterling handling
of doctrinal matters has been a pervasive, if subdued, theme within this Article, the concrete results they have reached are usually defensible. Thus,
there is at least some reason to hope that a factor-based balancing approach
would produce sensible accommodations in mass liability cases, even if the
opinions justifying these accommodations are not things of beauty.
6. Reduced Recoveries
Section 90's "injustice" requirement, while a necessary element for liability, plays a more limited role in determining damages. The section contemplates partial enforcement of the promise and flexible remedies by stating
29 9
that "[t]he remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Thus, either in conjunction with a balancing approach or otherwise, courts
confronted with mass liability promissory estoppel situations may consider
the option of limiting the plaintiff's damages. 3°° The advantage of such an
approach, of course, is that it limits the tangible dollar burden on promisors,
their insurers, and (ultimately) society, but also gives deserving claimants
some recovery.
Although section 90 does not specifically contemplate this approach, 30 1
the fairest and most justifiable methods of accomplishing this end are probably those that make the promisor's burden roughly proportional to the
promise's role in causing the plaintiff's losses. After a percentage-based determination of "inducement" like that suggested above,3 0 2 courts might reduce the plaintiff's damages by making them proportional to the share of
inducement contributed by the promise.3 0 3 Alternatively, courts might imi297. To implement such an approach properly, the courts must identify the relevant factors
of decision, make value judgments about their inherent importance, assess the extent to which
the facts implicate each factor, and somehow determine the resultant of all these competing
pushes and pulls.
298. Consider for example the sort of decision making required under the open-ended unconscionability doctrine of U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 110,
at 310, 314-16.
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).

300. Some recent tort reform measures pursue the same tactic. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102(l)(a) (1987) (punitive damages cannot exceed amount awarded as actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.80 (West Supp. 1988) ($450,000 limit on noneconomic
damages).
301. In particular, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment d (1981), the
section's partial enforcement comment, does not specifically refer to this possibility.
302. See supra text following note 293.
303. Cf Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303-04 (Utah 1981) (reducing
plaintiff's recovery in product liability case to that portion of plaintiff's damages equal to percentage of cause contributed by product defect). For example, if the defendant's promise

caused 60% of the plaintiff's reliance and other factors caused the remaining 40%, a plaintiff
suffering $10,000 in total losses would recover $6,000.
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tate existing comparative negligence and comparative fault rules 3° 4 by making recovery proportional to the percentage share of fault represented by the
defendant's breach of promise. 30 5 Finally, courts could adopt a "modified"
comparative fault approach under which the plaintiff would recover nothing
if the plaintiff's fault exceeds (or is equal to or exceeds) the defendant's
fault.30 6

IV.

CONCLUSION

"Like the camel in the Arab's tent," Professor Jay Feinman has remarked,
"once reliance had nosed into contract law it came to occupy more and more
space." '30 7 By now, however, reliance has left the tent and begun to forage
through the camp. One aspect of promissory estoppel's move toward independent theory status is its application in third-party suits whose results
cannot be explained on conventional contract grounds. Most of the policies
supporting promissory estoppel's expansion within contract law also support
this extension of reliance-based liability to third parties. But this particular
application of the reliance principle may create economic problems akin to
those now plaguing tort law. For that reason, promissory estoppel's extension to third parties may eventually become the most problematic and controversial of the doctrine's applications.

304. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 281, at 468-79.
305. Here, the unreasonableness of the third party's reliance may sometimes be a major
factor in reducing that party's recovery. Also, ordinary carelessness or a failure to take simple
precautions may have the same effect. For example, in Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d
399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 35, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555, 596 (1985), the unsuccessful plaintiff fell while
descending the darkened stairs to his apartment's basement in search of running water after a
city-wide blackout had caused both the lights and his water supply to cease operation. Rather
than denying the plaintiff any recovery, courts in similar future cases brought under promissory estoppel might reduce the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his own fault. For instance,
was it reasonable for Mr. Strauss to assume that he could find running water in the apartment's basement? Did he use a flashlight?
306. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 281, at 473-74 (describing this "modified" version of comparative negligence or comparative fault).
307. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A HistoricalPerspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373,
1374.

